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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Since its founding as a social welfare state, India has been meandering through “a life of 
contradictions” when it comes to social and economic equality. A potent indicator of this reality is 
the state of food and nutrition security across the country. India’s meager progress comes on the heels 
of rapid economic growth over the last two decades and a slew of public programs have attempted to 
address the multi-faceted nature of food and nutrition security. These efforts have included subsidized 
grains for households through the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), village health, 
nutrition and education programming through the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), 
and Nutrition Rehabilitation Centers (NRCs) to treat cases of severe acute malnutrition (SAM). 
Though these programs have been scaled across the country, numerous governance challenges and 
institutional failures have persisted. 
The latest development in India’s food and nutrition policy landscape is  the National Food 
Security Act (hereafter referred to as the Act) of 2013, which leverages existing national programs, 
including the TPDS and ICDS, to grant legal entitlements to nearly 70% of the total population. This 
Act was the fruit of a rights-based movement in India that demanded for over a decade to codify 
social and economic rights. However, the question arises as to whether this new Act been able to 
achieve its goal to ensure food and nutrition security by strengthening the governance of these 
programs? This is the central question of the present thesis.  
This thesis investigates how the Act has reformed the implementation of food and nutrition 
programs in the states of Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and the capital of New Delhi. The four key 
objectives of this study are to investigate 1) what changes are prescribed by the Act; 2) how effective 
these reforms have been in addressing persistent governance challenges; 3) what challenges remain 
and why; and 4) what strategies could be used to address these gaps. A qualitative case study 
approach was applied, which involved the following data collection methods: key informant and in-
depth interviews, focus group discussions, participant observation, matrix ranking and process net -
mapping, an innovative participatory tool that maps complex institutional processes and actors.  
This thesis is comprised of nine chapters. The first chapter introduces the puzzle of India’s 
nutritional status and explores why government efforts to tackle this problem have had tepid results. The 
second chapter presents the conceptual framework that defines governance challenges and an 
institutional framework of demand and supply side factors that contribute to effective policy and 
programming. Chapters three and four present an overview of the TPDS, ICDS and NRCs, and review 
the existing literature on the governance issues of these programs. Chapter 5 lays out the study design, 
methods and ethical protocols. Chapters six through eight explore each of the three programs and present 
key findings across the selected study sites. The last chapter presents cross-cutting conclusions for these 
programs in the wake of the Act and proposes a way forward to address institutional gaps in tackling 
food and nutrition security. 
The Act stipulates three core reforms for the TPDS: delegating the distribution of subsidized 
grains to community groups or collectives, such as women’s self-help groups and cooperatives; use of 
modern technologies to better manage the program; and the establishment of a grievance redressal 
mechanism. This study reveals that though the reforms have the potential to address institutional gaps, 
they have had mixed results. Women’s self-help groups have improved access to grains for many 
communities as they are locally embedded. However, the persistent problems of bribes and corruption 
persist on many levels, which force these groups to cut back on the grains they can distribute. In all three 
study sites, improved technologies such as using Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
for reporting had significant problems for the beneficiaries and the distributors alike, due to poor ICT 
infrastructure. Manual reporting is still required, which keeps the channels for extortion open. Grievance 
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redressal was found to be nearly nonexistent in all three study sites, and most respondents were not even 
aware of their legal rights or the relevant authority to direct their grievances. 
Unlike in case of the TPDS, the Act lays out few reforms for the ICDS, leaving its 
implementation at the discretion of individual states. The Act makes nutrition supplementation a legal 
entitlement for pregnant and lactating women, as well as children up to the age of 14. The ICDS 
supplement comes in the form of freshly prepared, nutrition-sensitive meals for children 3-6 years old. 
For infants and women, supplementation is in the form of take-home fortified food. In Jharkhand, ICDS 
workers reported having to still pay monthly bribes to senior officials to process their expenses. Both 
beneficiaries and ICDS workers pointed out that the take-home packets had failed both in terms of 
meeting local preferences and in reaching the target beneficiaries. In Madhya Pradesh, food preparation 
is delegated to local women’s self-help groups, which meant less funds are coming to ICDS workers, 
thus reducing the pot from which officials could expect bribes. However, many self-help groups report 
gaps in payment, forcing some to completely cease their ICDS meal operations. 
While the first two programs target food, a life-cycle approach must recognize the diverse 
determinants of good nutrition. To better understand the pathways that lead to poor nutrition, mothers 
of children diagnosed with SAM and admitted to NRCs were interviewed in Jharkhand and Madhya 
Pradesh. Participant observation and in-depth interviews with both patients and medical staff shed light 
on the operations of these facilities, as well as the experience of admitted mothers. Follow-up interviews 
were also conducted with discharged patients to understand how their NRC admission changed their 
understanding and approach to their child’s health and nutritional needs. The study showed that most 
NRCs suffered from insufficient staff and budgets to effectively rehabilitate both mother and child. 
Though the core purpose of such facilities is the education of the mother, most staff members focused 
on administrative reporting and monitoring rather than understanding individual cases and conditions of 
a child’s poor nutritional status. Prevalence of low education, child marriage and irregular livelihoods 
was high among the mothers. 
 The three programs covered in this study, TPDS, ICDS and NRCs, attempt to address different 
stages of faltering nutrition in India. The Act now provides a legal means to avail benefits of the TPDS 
and ICDS, but—as shown by this study—it has failed to eliminate the governance challenges embedded 
in these programs. Technology has been hailed as a silver bullet for the TPDS, however technology is 
only a tool within a larger program that runs under the supervision of officials who authorize grain 
distribution. The study proved that, consequently, individuals still interact with officials who exert their 
power and this ultimately translates into cutting grains to beneficiaries. Furthermore, in areas where 
electricity itself is unreliable, it is unrealistic to expect ICT solutions, such as electronic records, to be 
fail- and fool-proof. Transferring authority to community-based groups, which was another reform 
strategy, had mixed results. There is greater involvement of women in both the TPDS and ICDS, which 
has improved access for beneficiaries. However, these groups remain at the mercy of administrators and 
officials who can leverage their authority. The NRC study highlights how symptoms of poor nutrition 
run deep in Indian society and require a more holistic approach to improve the status of those who are 
held primarily responsible for nutrition – women. The combination of poverty and gender norms that 
characterize many of the communities significantly handicaps all programs that expect women to 
transform their child’s health outcomes, when their own health and nutrition status are often 
compromised. Greater initiative is required to improve opportunities for young girls and women, 
whether it be education, antenatal and health care services and livelihood security. Finally, the right to 
food requires an aware public that understands their entitlements and the responsibilities of the state to 
provide these benefits, for which a grievance mechanism is essential. Education campaigns, public 
hearings and grievance camps are measures within civil society that can ignite awareness, which is at 
the foundation of a successful rights-based approach and nutrition secure future. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG  
Seit der Gründung des Wohlfahrtsstaates erlebt Indien eine Reihe von Widersprüchen, was die 
soziale und wirtschaftliche Gerechtigkeit des Landes angeht. Ein aussagekräftiger Indikator 
dieser Realität ist der Stand der Ernährungsicherheit im Land. Indiens dürftiger Fortschritt in 
der Ernährungssicherung folgt einer zwei Jahrzehnte andauernden Periode rasantem 
Wirtschaftswachstum, sowie einer Reihe von öffentlichen Programmen, die versuchen, die 
vielschichtigen Aspekte von Ernährung zu adressieren. Zu diesen Bemühungen gehören 
subventioniertes Getreide für Haushalte durch das gezielte öffentliche Vergabesystem TPDS, 
dörfliche Gesundheits-, Ernährungs- und Bildungsprogramme durch die Integrierten 
Dienstleistungen zur Entwicklung von Kindern ICDS und Rehabilitierungszentren für Fälle von 
schwerer akuter Mangelernährung (NRCs). Obwohl diese Programme auf ganz Indien 
ausgeweitet wurden, bestehen weiterhin institutionelle Mängel sowie zahlreiche Governance-
Herausforderungen. Die jüngste Entwicklung in der Indischen Ernährungspolitik ist das Gesetz 
zur nationalen Ernährungssicherheit NFSA aus dem Jahr 2013. Das NFSA nutzt zwei 
bestehende nationale Programme, TPDS und ICDS, um  fast 70% der Bevölkerung 
Rechtsansprüche zu gewähren. Dieses Gesetz war das Ergebnis einer größeren rechtebasierten 
Bewegung in Indien, die seit über einem Jahrzehnt das Ziel hat, soziale und wirtschaftliche 
Rechte zu kodifizieren. Es stellt sich die Frage, ob dieses neue Gesetz es ermöglicht hat, durch 
eine Stärkung der Governance der bestehenden Programme einen Lebenszyklusansatz in der 
Ernährungssicherung zu etablieren. 
Diese Doktorarbeit verwendet einen Ansatz vergleichender Fallstudien, um zu 
untersuchen, wie das NFSA die Umsetzung der Ernährungsprogramme in den Staaten 
Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh und der Hauptstadt Neu Delhi reformiert hat. Die vier Hauptziele 
der Dissertation sind: 1) die Änderungen, die durch das NFSA vorgeschrieben wurden, zu 
beschreiben 2) die Effektivität dieser Reformen bei der Bewältigung von Governance-
Herausforderungen zu erklären, 3) die weiterhin bestehenden Governanceprobleme und Gründe 
dafür zu erklären, und 4) Strategien zu erarbeiten, die zur Behebung dieser Defizite beitragen 
können.  
Diese vier Aspekte wurden untersucht mittels Befragung von Schlüsselpersonen, 
Tiefeninterviews, Fokusgruppendiskussionen, teilnehmender Beobachtung, Matrix-Ranking 
und Prozessnetzkartierung (process net-mapping), ein innovatives und partizipatives 
Instrument, das komplexe institutionelle Prozesse und Akteure abbildet.  
Die vorliegende Doktorarbeit besteht aus neun Kapiteln. Das erste Kapitel gibt eine 
Einleitung in die Rätselhaftigkeit der Ernährungslage in Indien, und warum staatliche 
Bemühungen dieses Problem anzugehen, nur dürftige Ergebnisse erzielt haben. Das zweite 
Kapitel stellt einen konzeptionellen Rahmen bezüglich Governance-Herausforderungen und 
einen institutionellen Rahmen bezüglich Nachfrage- und Angebotsfaktoren, die zu 
wirkungsvollen Politikmaßnahmen und Programmgestaltung beitragen, dar. Kapitel drei und 
vier geben einen Überblick über TPDS, ICDS und NRCs, und über die bestehende Literatur 
bezüglich der Governance-Herausforderungen dieser drei Programme. Kapitel fünf beschreibt 
das Studiendesign, die angewandten Methoden und die Forschungsprotokolle. Kapitel sechs bis 
acht untersuchen jeweils eins der drei Programme und erklären Schlüsselergebnisse über die 
drei ausgewählten Untersuchungsstandorte hinweg. Die Dissertation schließt mit einer 
übergreifenden Zusammenfassung für diese Programme vor dem Hintergrund des neuen 
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Gesetzes und gibt wegweisende Vorschläge wie man diese institutionellen Defizite zur 
Verbesserung der Ernährungssicherheit adressiert. 
Das NFSA sieht drei Kernreformen für das TPDS vor: die Übertragung der Vergabe von 
subventioniertem Getreide auf Gruppen oder Gemeinschaften, wie Frauenselbsthilfegruppen 
(SHGs), die Nutzung von technologischen Lösungen, und die Einrichtung eines 
Beschwerdemechanismus. Die Studie zeigt auf, dass, obwohl die Reformen Potenzial zur 
Behebung der institutionellen Defizite haben, sie gemischte Ergebnisse erzielt haben. Da 
Frauenselbsthilfegruppen lokal eingebettet sind, haben sie den Zugang zu Getreide in vielen 
Dörfern verbessert. Die uralten Probleme wie Bestechung und Korruption bleiben auf vielen 
Ebenen weiterhin bestehen, was die Gruppen dazu zwingt, die Menge an ausgegebenem Getreide 
zu reduzieren. Aufgrund schlechter IT-Infrastruktur haben technologische Lösungen an allen drei 
Standorten Probleme sowohl für Leistungsempfänger als auch für Getreidelieferanten verursacht. 
Physische oder manuelle Rechnungslegung ist nach wie vor erforderlich, was 
Bestechungszahlungen möglich macht. Ein Beschwerdeverfahren gibt es quasi an keinem der drei 
Untersuchungsstandorten, und die Mehrzahl der Befragten kannte nicht einmal ihre gesetzlichen 
Rechte oder die zuständige Behörde, an die sie ihre Beschwerden richten könnten. 
Im Gegensatz zum TPDS sieht das Gesetz wenige Reformen für die ICDS vor, deren 
Umsetzung den einzelnen Staaten überlassen bleibt. Es beinhaltet einen Rechtsanspruch auf 
Nahrungsergänzung für schwangere und stillende Frauen, und für Kinder bis zum Alter von 14 
Jahren. Die ICDS-Nahrungsergänzung für Kinder von 3-6 Jahren wird in Form von frisch 
zubereiteten, nährstoffreichen Mahlzeiten angeboten. Für Säuglinge und Frauen erfolgt die 
Nahrungsergänzung in Form von angereicherter Nahrung. In Jharkhand berichteten ICDS-
Arbeiter, dass sie immer noch monatliche Bestechungsgelder an leitende Beamte zahlen mussten, 
damit diese ihre Kosten zur Übernahme bearbeiten. Sowohl Leistungsempfänger als auch ICDS-
Angestellte gaben an, dass die Essenspakete zur Mitnahme in die Haushalte sowohl hinsichtlich 
der Erfüllung der lokalen Präferenzen als auch hinsichtlich der Erreichung der Zielgruppen 
gescheitert seien. In Madhya Pradesh wird die Zubereitung von Speisen an lokale 
Frauenselbsthilfegruppen delegiert, was bedeutet, dass weniger Geld an die ICDS-Angestellten 
fließt und der Topf, von dem Beamte Bestechungsgelder erwarten können, kleiner wird. Viele 
Gruppen melden jedoch Zahlungslücken, so dass einige gezwungen sind, die Zubereitung und 
Ausgabe von Mahlzeiten einzustellen. 
Während die ersten beiden Programme auf Nahrungsmittel abzielen, muss ein 
Lebenszyklusansatz die verschiedenen Determinanten von Ernährung anerkennen. Um die Wege, 
die zu Mangelernährung führen, besser zu verstehen, wurden im Rahmen dieser Dissertation 
Mütter von Kindern befragt, bei denen eine schwere akute Mangelernährung diagnostiziert und 
die zu NRCs in Jharkhand und Madhya Pradesh zugelassen wurden. Teilnehmende Beobachtung 
und Tiefeninterviews mit Patienten und medizinischem Personal beleuchten den Betrieb dieser 
Einrichtungen sowie die Erfahrungen aufgenommener Mütter. Weiterhin wurden Folgeinterviews 
mit entlassenen Patienten durchgeführt, um zu verstehen, wie ihre Aufnahme in ein NRC ihr 
Verständnis und ihre Handlungsansätze bezüglich der Gesundheits- und Ernährungsbedürfnisse 
ihres Kindes verändert hat. Die meisten NRCs litten unter Personalmangel und einem 
unzureichendem Budget, um Mutter und Kind effektiv zu rehabilitieren. Obwohl der Kernzweck 
solcher Einrichtungen die Ausbildung der Mutter ist, konzentrierten sich eine Mehrzahl der 
Mitarbeiter auf die administrative Berichterstattung und Rechnungslegung, anstatt die 
individuellen Fälle und Bedingungen des schlechten Ernährungsstatus eines Kindes zu verstehen. 
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Bei den befragten Mütter war die Prävalenz von geringer Bildung, Kinderheirat und ungesicherter 
Lebensgrundlagen hoch. 
Sowohl TPDS als auch ICDS und NRCs versuchen, unterschiedliche Aspekte der 
Ernährungssicherheit in Indien zu adressieren. Das NFSA bietet nun ein rechtliches Mittel, um die 
Vorteile von TPDS und ICDS zu nutzen, jedoch hat es das Gesetz versäumt, die in vielen dieser 
Gemeinschaften verankerten Governance-Herausforderungen zu beseitigen. Technologische 
Lösungen  wurden als Königsweg für das TPDS gefeiert, aber Technologie ist nur ein Werkzeug 
innerhalb eines größeren Programms, das unter der Aufsicht von Beamten läuft, die die 
Getreideausgabe genehmigen. Folglich interagieren Einzelpersonen immer noch mit Beamten, die 
ihre Macht ausüben, was bedeutet, dass sie den Leistungsempfängern Getreide kürzen können, 
ohne dass dies im System erfasst wird. Darüber hinaus ist es in Gebieten mit unzuverlässiger 
Stromversorgung unrealistisch zu erwarten, dass technologische Lösungen stets funktionieren. 
Gemeinschaftsgruppen stellen eine gemischte Realität dar. Obwohl eine stärkere Beteiligung von 
Frauen sowohl beim TPDS als auch bei den ICDS den Zugang für die Leistungsempfänger 
verbessert hat, sind diese Gruppen immer noch der Gnade von Verwaltern und Beamten 
ausgeliefert, die ihre Autorität nutzen können. Selbst bei funktionierenden 
Ernährungsprogrammen zeigt die NRC-Studie, wie die Symptome von Mangelernährung tief 
verwurzelt in der indischen Gesellschaft sind und einen ganzheitlicheren Ansatz erfordern, um den 
Status derjenigen zu verbessern, die in erster Linie für die Ernährung verantwortlich sind - arme 
Frauen. Die Kombination von Armut und Geschlechternormen, die in vielen dieser 
Gemeinschaften eine Rolle spielt, behindert alle diese Programme, die von Frauen erwarten, dass 
sie den Gesundheitszustand ihres Kindes verbessern, wenn ihr eigener Gesundheits- und 
Ernährungszustand beeinträchtigt ist, erheblich. Es bedarf größerer Initiativen, um die Chancen 
für junge Mädchen und Frauen zu verbessern, sei es in den Bereichen Bildung, 
Schwangerschaftsvorsorge und anderer Gesundheitsdienste, sowie Existenzsicherung. Schließlich 
erfordert das Recht auf Nahrung eine informierte Öffentlichkeit, die ihre Leistungsansprüche und 
die Verantwortung des Staates in  der Leistungserbringung versteht. Dafür ist ein 
Beschwerdeverfahren unerlässlich. Aufklärungskampagnen, öffentliche Anhörungen und 
Beschwerdezentren sind bestehende Maßnahmen der Zivilgesellschaft, um das Bewusstsein zu 
schärfen, was die Grundlage für einen erfolgreichen rechtebasierten Ansatz und eine 
ernährungssichere Zukunft darstellt. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 State of Nutrition 
On the 26th of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In 
politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. 
In politics we will be recognizing the principle of one man one vote and one vote one 
value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic 
structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value. How long shall we 
continue to live this life of contradictions? How long shall we continue to deny equality 
in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny it for long, we will do so only by 
putting our political democracy in peril. 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Indian Constitution 
 
In the seven decades since these remarks were delivered on the eve of India’s passage of its 
Constitution, millions of citizens continue to battle a life of contradictions. One of the most glaring 
indicators of this reality is the state of food and nutrition security across the country, which has 
been alternatingly called “an enigma” (Ramalingaswami et al., 1996), “a curse” (Singh, 2008) and 
a “national shame” (IANS, 2012). India ranked 103 out of 119 countries in the 2018 Global 
Hunger Index, and the most recent round of the National Family Health Survey (International 
Institute for Population Sciences and ICF 2017) shows that stunting and wasting still afflict 
38.4% and 21% of children under the age of five, respectively. This meager progress has come 
despite high rates of economic growth for over two decades (Subramanyam et al., 2011) and 
India’s implementation of several large-scale social programs targeting different aspects of 
nutritional well-being (Drèze & Khera, 2017). Most notably, these have included the Targeted 
Public Distribution System (TPDS), the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) and 
more recently, the establishment of nutrition rehabilitation centers (NRCs) in government 
medical facilities to treat severe acute malnutrition (SAM). 
Though national progress in nutrition and health indicators such as stunting and wasting has 
been slower than desired, the experiences of individual states within India have varied 
significantly. Different states have experimented with interventions including food fortification 
(Fiedler et al., 2012), digitization of public programs (Mittal & Sengupta, 2018), daily lunch 
programs and involving community groups and collectives in food programs (Kumar et al., 
2018). The TPDS and ICDS have seen a multitude of reforms over their many decades, both at 
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central and state levels, however persistent challenges have hindered greater progress. At the 
forefront of factors contributing to this inadequate performance is the spate of governance 
challenges that cripple their implementation, ranging from budgetary constraints and financial 
mismanagement to systemic corruption and poor accountability mechanisms (Birner & Sekher, 
2018; Harriss & Kohli, 2009; Khera, 2011). 
A new chapter in these efforts came with the National Food Security Act of 2013 (NFSA, 
hereafter “the Act”), which made subsidized grains in the TPDS and nutrition supplementation 
under the ICDS, legal entitlements. The Act covers 75 percent of rural households, 50 percent 
of urban households, and also includes measures for empowerment and accountability, such as 
appointing the eldest female member as head of the household for collecting grains, setting up 
a tiered grievance redressal mechanism, and using technology to increase transparency 
(Government of India, 2013). 
In the years since the Act’s passage, it has experienced uneven rollout across the country 
and it is unclear whether this rights-based approach has translated into actual benefits for all 
eligible households. Earlier studies have pointed to the limitations of vigilance-focused 
governance reforms in implementing social program like the ICDS (Verma et al., 2018), as 
often the introduction of more actors for vigilance only stretches the number of pay-outs or 
bribes. Technology and e-governance have also been at the forefront of various government 
efforts, within India and abroad. While on one hand, these tools can improve transparency and 
accountability (Carr & Jago, 2014; Hanna, 2017), others argue that technology is only as 
effective as the larger system within which it is employed (Peixoto & Fox, 2016; Toyama, 
2015). Other work identifies that entitlements or policy changes alone are not enough to alter 
the power dynamics within a community and requires greater mobilization, awareness building 
and political will to translate rhetoric to tangible benefits (George & Branchini, 2017; 
Ruparelia, 2013; Verma et al., 2017). Therefore the impact of such reforms in a new rights-
based framework on governance challenges is an ongoing process, requiring more research to 
fill the gap in understanding the evolving dynamics. 
 To this end, India provides a novel case study as it has been at the forefront of a rights -
based movement for the better part of two decades on various socioeconomic rights. The 
country already has a range of food and nutrition programs, and the NFSA outlines reforms to 
ensure a multi-tiered system of governance across the central and state governments, to local 
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villages to reach individuals. Furthermore, India’s diversity, particularly with regard to the 
adaption of various social programs and their implementation, lend itself to a comparative case 
study that can provide insights from contrasting state experiences and contexts. This allows for 
comparison across different state settings but also across programs addressing food and 
nutrition security. 
 
1.2 Objectives and Research Questions 
The overall objective of this thesis is to examine how the right to food approach in India vis-à-vis 
the NFSA has addressed the governance challenges that have long plagued the TPDS and ICDS. 
The third program in this study, NRCs, looks beyond the two core programs of the NFSA to 
explore how families experience and understand undernutrition, while identifying the various 
pathways to poor nutrition. From these objectives, the specific research questions that follow are: 
1. What are the specific reforms stipulated under the NFSA for food and nutrition programs, 
specifically the TPDS and the ICDS? 
2. How have these reforms been implemented, when applicable, for each program on the 
ground? 
3. How effective have these reforms been in curbing existing governance challenges of these 
programs? 
4. What challenges have persisted or developed since the passage of the Act, and why? 
5. What strategies could address these challenges and supplement the broader approach to 
tackling food and nutrition insecurity? 
 
1.3 Methodological Approach 
This thesis adopts a qualitative case study approach and uses positive deviance to select states with 
contrasting performance in reducing child stunting, to compare their respective policy and program 
experiences. As individual states in India have discretion in how they administer their social 
programs, this approach allows us to glean what institutional arrangements in social programs may 
help address existing governance challenges. A key method used in examining these policy and 
governance implications is the process net-map (Schiffer & Hauck, 2010), which is a promising 
participatory tool to map complex processes and a multitude of stakeholders that influence the 
outcomes of a given program. The process net-map can help identify governance challenges by 
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visualizing complex governance realities, with limited resources and adaptability to different 
settings (Birner & Sekher, 2018). This tool has been successfully applied in earlier studies 
conducted in many developing countries, including India, to study governance challenges of public 
programs (Poku et al., 2018; Sekher et al., 2017; Verma et al., 2018). 
 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises of nine chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 presents a conceptual 
framework for understanding governance challenges of food and nutrition programs broadly, and 
an institutional framework to examine demand and supply side approaches for nutrition policy or 
program. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the three programs studied in this thesis (TPDS, ICDS 
and NRCs), which is followed by a literature review on governance challenges pertaining to these 
specific programs in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 outlines the rationale of the study, its case study 
approach and the methods applied for each program. Chapters 6 and 7 delve into the findings on 
the functioning of the TPDS and ICDS, respectively, since the passage of the NFSA. Chapter 8 
examines the NRCs in the states of Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh and what the experience of 
admitted patients reveals about the pathways to severe acute malnutrition, offering insight on what 
may be missing from India’s wider approach to tackling these challenges. Chapter 9 concludes this 
thesis with a synthesis of the key findings across the three programs, putting into context how the 
rights-based approach has transferred into actual institutional change and recommendations. 
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2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 Nourishing Nutrition 
Tackling the many forms of poor nutrition have been a global challenge given the wide range of 
factors that can affect nutrition outcomes including socioeconomic background, education, food 
diversity, physical activity, sanitation and hygiene, and genetics (Gillespie, Haddad, Mannar, 
Menon, & Nisbett, 2013; Hammond & Dube, 2012; Herforth & Ballard, 2016; Soni, Masoud, & 
Bhutta, 2018), making it a “wicked problem” (Delaney et al., 2018; Nisbett, 2017). A multi-
pronged approach is required to address the diverse needs of an individual, especially in the first 
1000 days of life, to ensure healthy physical and cognitive development. Figure 2.1 lays out a 
framework for achieving optimal fetal and child nutrition as proposed by Black et al. (2013), 
outcomes that require a foundation of conducive institutional and governance conditions. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Framework for achieving optimal fetal and child nutrition and development 
Source: Black et al., 2013 
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India’s approach to nutrition has faced criticism for overlooking several aspects listed in this 
framework. Many have argued that much of existing food and nutrition policy has focused on 
delivering a minimum quantity of staple grains, rather than the holistic approach laid out in Figure 
2.1 (Banerjee, 2011; Haddad et al., 2012). Moreover, even with a narrow focus of distributing 
subsidized grains and meals, these programs and policies have been subject to longstanding 
governance failures (Government of India, 2005; Khera, 2011; Swain & Kumaran, 2012), which 
will be further explored in Chapter 4. 
 
2.2 Governance Challenges of Nutrition Programs 
Most nutrition programs consist of two core components: 1) an in-kind distribution of food or 
nutrition supplementation, and 2) an educational or awareness building program to improve 
understanding of the complex factors associated with nutrition. Three broad categories of actors 
can administer such programs or services: the market, the state, and “the third sector,” which can 
consist of civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGO) or community-based 
organizations (Birner & Sekher, 2018). 
From the market perspective, two main problems arise with nutrition programs: the nature 
of nutrition advice as a merit good, and information asymmetry. In the first instance, education or 
awareness campaigns relating to maternal or child nutrition have the characteristics of a merit good 
as these services or programs are undervalued, and even where their importance is recognized, 
poorer segments of the population may forego them due to their cost (Hjerppe, 1997; Musgrave, 
2018; Ver Eecke, 2003). Many individuals fail to invest in such services as the benefits are not 
immediate; therefore market actors may not be able to see strong demand to offer such goods or 
services, creating a need for government intervention. This lack of understanding of the value of 
such goods seeps into the second problem of information asymmetry. Many individuals do not 
fully understand that nutrition products available in the market are not necessarily substitutes for 
breast feeding and other essential hygiene or health-related practices. This lack of understanding, 
or misunderstanding presents failures that make the market a difficult vehicle to administer such 
nutrition programs or services. 
The second category of actors is the state and government agencies. Here too, there are 
various challenges that can arise in implementing nutrition related programs and services. First, as 
rooted in transaction cost economics (Birner & Braun, 2009; Birner & Sekher, 2018), nutrition 
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programs prove to be transaction-intensive as they require regular provision of services but also 
must be scaled widely to all corners of a country. This demands a sizeable army of frontline 
workers who can deliver these goods and services, which in itself creates a number of problems, 
such as supervision of staff. Such programs also require high levels of discretion to customize 
programs to local needs, which assumes that a government agency has strong government capacity. 
Low government capacity, especially in the Indian context (Mukherji, 2008, 2017), leads to 
additional problems such as staff absenteeism, leakages, poor quality of nutrition goods, and 
problems of targeting and elite capture. 
The final category of actors is that of third sector organizations, such as NGOs, community-
based organizations, and individual households. This group of actors can play an important role in 
implementing nutrition programs, but often are limited in scale as they may be constrained by 
funds. NGOs can also face challenges in procurement, much like the state, such as political 
tampering and delivering poor quality goods and services. Community-based organizations have 
had a growing role in the implementation of various social programs, including nutrition programs, 
as they are often rooted in the community allowing greater empowerment and understanding of 
local needs. However, such organizations often encounter free-rider problems endemic to many 
collective action endeavors, as well as problems of social exclusion of certain members in the 
community and local elite capture. Finally, even within households, food and nutrition distribution 
is not guaranteed. Many sociocultural contexts, including India, have food and dietary practices 
that often disadvantage women and young girls who either eat last or eat least (Coffey, 2015; Vir 
et al., 2014). 
 
2.3 Rights the Right Framework? 
This overview of governance challenges highlights the complexity of both tackling the 
determinants of nutrition itself, but also the roll-out of programs to address this challenge. In the 
Indian context, all these challenges have been evident in programs such as the TPDS and ICDS 
for years and were seen as contributing to the slow rate of reduction in various nutrition outcomes, 
particularly among children (Bhasin et al., 2001; Dubowitz et al., 2007; Jain, 2015). The issue of 
nutrition and program failures gained momentum through advocacy led by the Right to Food 
Campaign that catalyzed political will and public attention on the faltering progress of nutrition 
(Sinha & Patnaik, 2016). Alongside civil society initiatives, individual states adopted common-
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sense reforms in their food programs and became models for other states to follow their lead (Drèze 
& Khera, 2010; Krishnamurthy et al., 2014). 
The passage of the NFSA laid a legal foundation for accountability and entitlements to 
existing food and nutrition programs. The rights-based approach to food and nutrition in India is 
embedded in India’s constitutional guarantee of “Protection of life and personal liberty” which 
ensures that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law” (Mander, 2012). This protection has evolved over time into a multi-
faceted concept, much like nutrition, which requires food and nutrition for life to be protected. 
With a rights approach, responsibility is legally transferred to governments to respect, protect and 
fulfill obligations (Banik, 2016; Hunter et al., 2017). 
Building the political commitment of individual states and advocacy among civil society 
groups in the short-term requires a separate set of skills and approaches than converting this 
momentum into visible results (Gillespie et al., 2013).The complexity of achieving food security 
and nutrition goes well beyond food availability and requires a holistic set of political and policy 
processes that yield an “enabling environment” conducive to the nutrition agenda (Gillespie et al., 
2013). While the Act that was passed does not address nutrition security in all its complexities, it 
does leverage government programs that have had a mixed track record in performance to deliver 
the entitlements for a right to food. How then can the Act address the governance challenges 
outlined earlier, to ensure efficient and accountable implementation? 
A useful way to conceptualize what may be critical for this conversion of commitment to 
results, especially in the case of a rights-based approach that places obligations on the state, is by 
examining whether there are complementing empowerment and efficiency linkages (Birner & von 
Braun, 2014). Empowerment linkages are defined as the ability of citizens to demand services 
while holding the providers accountable. Efficiency linkages focus on the supply-side factors that 
ensure the capacity of an agency or provider to deliver a program or service (Birner & von Braun, 
2014). Figure 2.2 captures the linkages in the context of implementing the NFSA and its 
stipulations for food and nutrition programs. 
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Figure 2.2: Framework for improving food and nutrition programs via NFSA: 
demand and supply-side approaches 
Source: Adapted from Birner, 2007; Birner & von Braun, 2014 
 
As the framework in Figure 2.2 shows, the NFSA’s key empowerment linkages are the existence 
of a legal entitlement itself and the establishment of a grievance redressal system where individuals 
can voice their complaints and concerns. The key efficiency linkages are through the 
decentralizing of services to community groups, such as women’s SHGs and cooperatives, so that 
they are more locally rooted. Computerization is another measure to build efficiency in the 
management of operations and permit greater transparency for all stakeholders involved. 
Since the momentum kicked up by the confluence of both civil society and political agents 
gave way to the NFSA in 2013, it is unclear how the bill has translated into institutional changes 
on the ground. From the supply-side, the NFSA as a right puts a legal burden on central and state 
governments to deliver subsidized grains and set up a grievance redressal mechanism (Mander, 
2016). However, from the demand-side, there is evidence that “empowerment” that can affect 
undernutrition is linked to various factors in the Indian context ranging from caste and class to 
female literacy and political participation (Harriss & Kohli, 2009). A recent study on the micro-
politics of food access in rural Maharashtra noted that as entitlements must be claimed, there has 
to be a minimum level of political agency at the village-level without which patronage 
relationships arise (Rai & Smucker, 2016). Consequently, while the interplay of supply-side and 
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demand-side factors is crucial to ensure accountability and empowerment, equally influential 
factors may still hamper the mechanisms the Act has put into place. Through this study, the specific 
reforms for each program will be analyzed to determine whether governance challenges that have 
thus far impeded individuals from availing food and nutrition benefits are still at play. 
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3. OVERVIEW OF FOOD AND NUTRITION PROGRAMS  
The National Food Security Act declares it will provide: 
 
…food and nutritional security in human life cycle approach, by ensuring 
access to adequate quantity of quality food at affordable prices to people to 
live a life with dignity and for matters connected therewith or incidental 
thereto (Government of India, 2013b). 
 
The Act identifies the TPDS and the ICDS to deliver food-based benefits to households, young 
children and women. Under the Act, the TPDS targets two types of households, “priority” 
(previously categorized as “below the poverty line”) and Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), the 
poorest of the poor households. The ICDS has no such cut-offs for availing its services, however 
it does target pregnant women, lactating mothers, young children, from six months to six years of 
age, and adolescent girls, all groups that are seen as nutritionally vulnerable (Desai et al., 2016; 
Desai & Vanneman, 2015). While these two programs address preventative measures of food and 
nutrition security, the third program in this study, nutrition rehabilitation centers (NRCs), 
addresses the management of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) among children and nutrition-
related medical complications. This chapter outlines the evolution of these three programs over 
time to better understand their objectives and reforms till date. 
 
3.1. Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) 
The TPDS has come a long way since its origins in the 1930s when the British set it up to address 
food shortages in urban settings during World War II (Government of India, 2005). In the 25 years 
that followed, the public distribution system’s operations ebbed and flowed in the aftermath of 
World War II, the Partition of India and Pakistan at which time food supplies were uncertain, and 
then again in the first decade after Independence where there was no consistent food policy (Mooij, 
1998). During the 1950s and 1960s, India’s dependence on food imports from the United States at 
a time when geopolitical alignments were not always favorable, meant ongoing uncertainty on 
meeting food grains requirements to feed the nation (Mukherji, 2017). It was only in the wake of 
India’s Green Revolution in the 1960s that the country finally reached food self-sufficiency 
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(Ahmed & Varshney, 2008), and the public distribution system became part of a larger 
procurement and distribution scheme to support technology adoption by farmers (Pingali, 2012). 
The Food Corporation of India (FCI) procures grains from farmers and provides a minimum 
support price (MSP), along with other government-backed subsidies on farm inputs and resources. 
These grains are then stored in state and central storage facilities, both as a buffer against market 
volatility as well as to distribute for various public programs, such as the TPDS, mid-may meal 
programs and more recently, the ICDS (Dev & Babu, 2016). 
 Until the early 1990s, the public distribution system was a quasi-universal program with 
fewer cut-offs for eligibility (Mane, 2006). However in the wake of India’s liberalization reforms 
and the advice of international agencies, notably the World Bank, budgets had to be streamlined 
and the PDS became a targeted program, hence TPDS (Swaminathan, 2008). Households were 
categorized as below the poverty line (BPL) or above the poverty line (APL), with separate 
provisions for each category. The main difference was that BPL households got more subsidized 
grains along with kerosene, sugar and salt, while APL households mainly received non-grain 
benefits of the program. In subsequent years, additional groups like the AAY and also the 
Annapurna scheme for the elderly who are eligible for ten kilograms of grain were established 
(Guha-Khasnobis & Vivek, 2007). 
 Recent expansions in the TPDS have been the result of state-led reforms of food programs, 
as well as civil society agitation around the deplorable state of nutrition (FAO, 2014). From the 
early 2000s, several individual states began to expand their beneficiary lists to include more 
vulnerable members or communities, as well as incorporate technical improvements to boost 
efficiency, including end-to-end computerization, involving community-based groups for 
distribution, and using mobile technology to disseminate information on the arrival of grains at the 
local distribution point (Misra, 2010; Rajan et al., 2016; Swain & Sen, 2009). In parallel, the civil 
society push for a multitude of socioeconomic rights, including the right to information and the 
right to education, fueled urgency to act on the state of nutritional deprivation (Béland, 2015). The 
result of these parallel movements led to the birth of the NFSA. 
 The TPDS operates through a network of fair price shops (FPS), and the FPS owner is 
locally known as the “dealer.” While at the outset FPS were generally run by private individuals, 
over the last decade and a half there has been a strong shift in many states to allocating FPS to 
community and/or group-based operators to increase accountability (Drèze & Khera, 2013; Sekher 
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et al., 2017). FPS operators buy the grains from their respective state food and civil supplies office 
at a pre-determined rate, and then earn commission on the sale of grains as per the rates fixed by 
the state. While FPS dealers are permitted to sell other items or inventory, most focus on the sale 
of the items provisioned by the government under the TPDS. 
 The NFSA stipulates to “progressively undertake” specific state-led reforms, including a 
push for community institutions or groups to manage the FPS and incorporating technology in 
operations. The Act also has a section titled “Women Empowerment” which makes the eldest 
woman, 18 years of age or older, the head of the household for the ration card used to purchase 
subsidized grains. Each member of a priority household is legally entitled to five kilograms of 
subsidized wheat and rice, while AAY households receive a flat sum of 35 kilograms of subsidized 
wheat and rice (Government of India, 2013b). 
 
3.2 Integrated Child Development Services 
India adopted a National Policy for Children in 1974, leading to the creation of the ICDS one year 
later to target the health and nutrition needs of children (Rao, 2005). Since a child’s health and 
nutritional needs are closely linked to that of its mother, the program covers health and nutrition 
services for adolescent girls, pregnant women and lactating mothers (Patnaik et al., 2008). At the 
heart of the ICDS program is the anganwadi center (AWC; literally “courtyard” shelter) which 
currently number over 13,000 across the country where children, young girls and women can avail 
six services: 1) immunization, 2) health check-ups, 3) referral services, 4) nutrition and health 
education, 5) supplementary nutrition and 6) early childhood care and pre-school education (Kapur 
& Baisnab, 2018). 
 Ideally, an AWC’s activities are overseen by two staff members, the Anganwadi Worker 
(AWW) and the Anganwadi Helper (AWH; locally known as “Sevika”). The general division of 
tasks is that the AWH is responsible for calling or collecting children and preparing the meals at 
the AWC, while the AWW is responsible for educational programming at the AWC, along with 
maintaining the various registers including a list of anthropometric measures of children and 
pregnant and lactating mothers, take-home ration (THR) registers, information on various health 
initiatives and home visits. In addition to these responsibilities, the AWW is often called forth to 
execute any other community or health-related services, such as the roll-out of schemes to build 
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toilets, monitor open defecation, enrolling community members for Voter IDs and most recently 
enrollment in the Aadhaar program (Jain, 2017). 
 The AWW and AWH are supported in health-related services by the Accredited Social 
Health Activist (ASHA) and Auxiliary Nurse/Midwife (ANM), who fall under the Primary 
Healthcare Center (PHC) system in villages (Nambiar & Muralidharan, 2017; R. Ved et al., 2018) 
They are present for the monthly immunization drives as well as for antenatal and maternal 
services or follow-ups. The AWW’s work and performance are overseen by a Lady Supervisor 
(LS) who reports to the Child Development Project/Program Officer (CDPO) at the block-level, 
who then reports to the District Program/Project Officer (DPO). (This is a broad overview of the 
administrative framework; slight variations may exist from state to state.)  
 The ICDS program was universalized in 2008-2009, with over 50 percent of the ICDS and 
AWC expansion taking place after 2005 (Government of India, 2012). While recognition of the 
importance of early childhood and women’s health was welcomed, it has also exacerbated various 
existing problems, such as inadequate infrastructure and human resources that have spillover 
effects on the management, oversight, and ultimate outreach to ICDS beneficiaries (Government 
of India, 2012; Ved, 2009).  
 As management of the ICDS falls under the purview of individual states, there have been 
significant changes in their operation over the years to address the specific needs of a given 
community. These include the greater inclusion of SHGs to supply nutritional provisions, creating 
mother’s groups/committees for greater vigilance and accountability, streamlining government 
programs for greater efficiency, providing performance incentives to AWWs, providing more 
nutritional options and diversity in the meals provided and setting up “model” AWCs with 
renovated buildings, toys and supplies for children’s play and education (Government of India, 
2013a; Maestre & Poole, 2018; The World Bank, 2006).  
Joining this long list of reforms is the NFSA, which establishes legal entitlements for 
pregnant women, lactating mothers and children up to the age of 14. For women, the Act stipulates: 
1) a meal, free of charge during pregnancy and six months after childbirth through the local AWC; 
and 2) financial maternity benefits of no less than rupees six thousand. For children up to the age 
of fourteen years, the Act guarantees that: 1) those between six months and six years of age will 
be given an age appropriate meal free through the local AWC that meets prescribed nutritional 
standards; and 2) children up to 8th grade or between ages six and fourteen years will receive one 
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free mid-day meal except on school holidays (Government of India, 2013b). There are additional 
provisions ensuring appropriate facilities for cooking meals, drinking water and sanitation in both 
schools and AWC; children who suffer from malnutrition are also to be identified and provided 
free meals. However, unlike with the TPDS, the Act neither specifies reforms on the management 
or delivery of the nutrition components of the program, nor has a separate grievance redressal 
mechanism. 
 
3.3 Nutrition Rehabilitation Centers 
Unlike the TPDS and ICDS, nutrition rehabilitation centers (NRCs) have entered the arena of 
nutrition programs in India more recently, though they have had greater traction in many other 
parts of the world, especially in the aftermath of civil strife, conflict and natural disasters 
(“Nutrition Rehabilitation Centers,” 1968). NRCs target the treatment and rehabilitation of 
children diagnosed with severe acute malnutrition (SAM). In addition to providing medical and 
nutritional treatment for the SAM child, a critical focus of the program is the education and training 
of the child’s mother in the care of the child’s nutritional and health needs. In India, NRCs were 
initially introduced under the Bal Shakti Yojana (literally meaning “Child Strength Scheme”) of 
the National Rural Health Mission in the state of Madhya Pradesh, with over 90% of targeted SAM 
children treated through the state’s 258 NRCs (Dasgupta et al., 2014). In addition to medical staff, 
NRCs leverage village-level health workers and AWWs already working in rural communities to 
refer patients. Though most facilities are still run at government hospitals, there are efforts to 
expand community-based facilities for the treatment of SAM as well. 
Global organizations have also been key partners in the management of SAM in India, such 
as UNICEF, World Vision and WHO aid in training, reporting and monitoring of NRCs. Other 
states in India have since taken Madhya Pradesh’s example to establish such centers to address 
SAM, including Jharkhand setting up Malnutrition Treatment Centers (MTCs), Orissa, Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh (National Health Mission Madhya Pradesh, 2015; Singh et al., 2014; Taneja et al., 
2012). However Madhya Pradesh still remains the state with the highest density of such facilities, 
with nearly every district and block covered. 
 The operational guidelines for facility-based management of SAM children lists four 
objectives: provide clinical management and reduce mortality among children with SAM; promote 
physical and psychosocial growth of children with SAM; build capacity of mothers in the care of 
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their children; and identify the social factors that contributed to the development of SAM  
(Government of India, 2011). At the facility itself, the guidelines state various services be provided 
around the clock, including care and monitoring of the child; treatment of medical complications; 
therapeutic feeding; providing sensory stimulation and emotional care; social assessment of the 
family to identify and address contributing factors; counseling on appropriate feeding, care and 
hygiene; demonstration and practice by mothers in the preparation of energy dense foods using 
locally available, culturally acceptable and affordable food items; and follow-up of children 
discharged from the facility. 
Operations of these facilities also vary from state to state depending on the needs of the 
local community as well as on the funding provided for the establishment and oversight of this 
program. There is less information available in the literature on how NRCs have been reformed 
over time, most likely because compared to the TPDS and ICDS, these are newer programs based 
at medical institutions with a very specific focus on the treatment of SAM cases. Much of the 
evolution of NRCs has been in their use and adoption of newer global standards for the 
identification and treatment of SAM children courtesy the WHO and UNICEF (Singh et al., 2014; 
UNICEF, 2015). However, less literature is available on how they have evolved in the Indian 
setting. 
One alternative to facility-based management of SAM has been the push for greater 
community-based management of SAM which has had trials in some pockets of the country, such 
as Bihar. As much of SAM occurs in the absence of medical complications, many practitioners 
argue that community-based treatment may be better suited, especially in cases where households 
are remotely placed or lack adequate resources to admit themselves to the NRC. However, this has 
not been mainstreamed as yet in the management of SAM children in the country and still has a 
way to go to even expand its reach to every district of all states where undernutrition continues to 
be a major public health concern (Burza et al., 2015; Kumar et al., 2013). 
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4. LITERATURE REVIEW  
India’s historical challenges in securing large-scale nutrition security have fueled extensive study 
into its experiences and strategies to tackle this problem over the years. The evolving 
understanding of the concept of food security globally, its components, and its pathways have 
significantly advanced the discourse and assessment of nutrition broadly (Gross et al., 2000; 
Headey & Ecker, 2013). Consequently, the breadth of existing academic literature is substantial. 
Studies have covered vast ground on understanding the state of food security and improving 
nutrition in India by examining food consumption (Agrawal et al., 2019; Parappurathu et al., 2015), 
food access and availability (Abha Gupta & Mishra, 2018; Ritchie et al., 2018), delivery of public 
programs (Drèze et al., 2014; Kishore & Chakrabarti, 2015; Siddiqui et al., 2017), anthropometric 
outcomes of nutrition (Avula et al., 2018; E. et al., 2017; Thakur et al., 2011), the role of gender 
(Kumar et al., 2018; Padmaja et al., 2019) and education initiatives (Meena & Meena, 2018) as 
well as outcomes (Vikram & Chindarkar, 2020), to name but a few. While many authors identify 
the institutional and governance challenges laden in the implementation of India’s various public 
programs (Afridi, 2017; Biswas & Verma, 2009; Mohmand, 2012), few have delved into the 
mechanics of these behemoth programs to identify gaps and opportunities. To this end, this chapter 
examines institutional gaps and failures identified in the broader literature to help understand how 
individual states have adopted different institutional arrangements to improve delivery outcomes 
of social programs. 
 
4.1 Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) 
Through the 1980s, India’s public distribution system was universal, though access in remote and 
tribal areas was a challenge (Bedamatta, 2017). India’s PDS became the “targeted” PDS in 1997, 
setting a poverty line to distinguish households that were above the poverty line (APL) and below 
the poverty line (BPL) (Chhotray et al., 2020). With the shift to the TPDS and growing concerns 
about the delivery of food grains, there was a surge in the literature surrounding the implementation 
of this program, with heavy focus on the various governance challenges it encountered.  
A 2005 evaluation of the TPDS (Government of India, 2005) produced arguably the most 
damning assessment of the functioning of the program up until then. The cross-sectional survey 
across 60 districts in 18 states found that the program was replete with targeting errors, existence 
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of ghost cards and unidentified households. The evaluation also noted that fair price shops (FPS) 
that sell the subsidized grains were unviable, which partly explained the motivation for leakages 
and diversion of grains (58%). Furthermore, the evaluation highlighted that just over half of 
eligible households below the poverty line received their grains. The 2005 evaluation provided a 
comprehensive breakdown of the governance failures in the TPDS including large-scale grain 
diversion as well as exclusion and inclusion errors. 
Subsequent years saw state-level reforms take root, such as incorporating technology in 
TPDS operations. Some studies found this an effective intervention in enhancing transparency and 
giving access to beneficiaries of their entitlements (Rajan et al., 2016), but it did little to control 
for quality of grains or the frequency of technical failures at a store (Masiero, 2015). Perhaps most 
notably, technology has not helped curb the diversions that occur at the point of sale as there is no 
technological accounting of this shortfall (Drèze et al., 2017).  
Handing over of FPS to community groups was another move aimed at curbing leakages 
and pilferage of grains from the system (Sekher et al., 2017). Studies have corroborated improved 
availability of food grains in states that transferred control of fair price shops (FPS) to local 
members of the community (Drèze et al., 2014; Krishnamurthy et al., 2014c). Decentralized 
procurement of grains has been another reform that has led to self-sufficiency in food grains among 
states, allowing for local supply rather than having to import across states (Banerjee, 2011; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2014a). Finally, the exclusion and inclusion errors that had been rampant in 
the years after stricter targeting protocols was addressed through individual states taking up the 
costs of expanding beneficiary lists beyond the fixed “targeting” levels (Bose et al., 2014; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2014b; Puri, 2012). Notably, even before the passage of the NFSA, the state 
of Chhattisgarh passed its own rights legislation to guarantee legal entitlements to subsidized 
grains (Rajan et al., 2016).  
Since the NFSA and the reforms it outlined set in, many studies have tried to assess the 
scale of improvement in the operations of these programs. An eight-state study estimated that the 
percentage of PDS leakages in six out of eight of the survey states had declined and in two states 
stayed the same (Drèze & Khera, 2017). This same study found an increased consumption of TPDS 
grains in several states with the percentage of households buying rice or wheat from the PDS in 
the past month rising from 27 to 52 percent within 8 years. A study conducted in New Delhi notes 
that while there were positive impacts, such as 98 percent of ration cards bearing a female 
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household head (as mandated under the NFSA), 52 percent of beneficiaries experienced difficulties 
in availing their entitlements due to digital or electronic challenges at the FPS and 48 percent of 
households had at least one person left off the ration card (Nayak & Nehra, 2017). Citing the 
example of Jharkhand, the authors describe how pilferage of TPDS food grains has fallen 
substantially from 85% leakage of grains in 2004-05. Instead, the main source of leakage is due to 
cuts made at the point of sale, which can be as much as 20 percent of the cardholder’s entitled 
grains (Drèze et al., 2017). While this is an improvement in the case of Jharkhand, such instances 
are still too common especially in the more removed areas and communities where these food 
grains critically contribute to household food security. Moreover, quality of grains still varies 
significantly and still compels households to opt for the open market over subsidized grains 
(Panigrahi & Pathak, 2015). 
 
4.2 Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) 
The ICDS program was universalized in 2008-2009, with over 50% of the ICDS and AWC 
expansion taking place after 2005 (Government of India, 2012). While recognition of the 
importance of a strong focus on early childhood and women’s health was welcomed, it has also 
exacerbated various existing problems such as inadequate infrastructure and human resources that 
have spillover effects on the management, oversight, and ultimate outreach to the beneficiaries 
(Government of India, 2012; Ved, 2009). At the central or state levels, allocation of funding for 
the program as well as its actual distribution to the intended programs or services has often been 
questioned. This has included Indian states like Uttar Pradesh, long identified as a chronic 
underperformer in curbing levels of child undernutrition and stunting, returning funds meant to be 
allocated for the running of the ICDS in its state (Rao, 2017). Significant disparity in operations 
have also been studied between urban and rural AWCs, where the former are often seen to have 
better access to resources and consequently ensure basic amenities and facilities unlike rural 
counterparts (Mukherjee & Rome, 2013). 
Studies have also long identified bribes for various administrative officials in the 
monitoring of AWWs and leakages of funds and resources intended for the beneficiary or the 
running of the AWC (Verma et al., 2018). These lapses at the higher levels have often been seen 
as an impediment to better performance of AWWs who are overworked, underpaid, and often have 
little incentive to carry out their duties (Sahoo et al., 2016). In addition, to make up for the different 
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financial expenses they incur (e.g. through corruption), AWWs have also been observed as making 
use of or selling resources, such as grains and food supplies, intended for nutritional programs at 
the AWC (Gupta, 2001; Saxena & Srivastava, 2009). 
 In addition to the gaps in performance of administrators of the program, there are local 
dynamics that have been observed as an impediment to the performance of an AWC, particularly 
stemming from pre-existing social divisions that may exist in a community either due to religious 
or caste segregation (Bose et al., 2014). Earlier studies have even pointed out that the main 
nutrition gains through the ICDS were going to those in upper socioeconomic groups, while 
nutrition among girls from lower socioeconomic groups worsened (Lokshin et al., 2005). Some 
have also called into question the quality of the nutritional program, despite their being guidelines 
on nutrient content of the food or ration provided through the AWC (Jain, 2015; N. Rao & Kaul, 
2018). Ultimately either due to the teeming list of responsibilities of AWWs, or due to lack of 
incentives, doubts have also been cast on the quality of the actual record-keeping and reporting 
conducted. As the lynchpin to gauging the performance of the ICDS in a state, this can challenge 
the ability to implement effective reforms and identify bottlenecks (Government of India, 2013). 
 As such programs are managed by individual states, there have been significant changes in 
their operation over the years to address the specific needs of a given community. These include 
the greater inclusion of SHGs to supply nutritional provisions, creating mother’s 
groups/committees for greater vigilance and accountability, streamlining government programs 
for greater efficiency, providing wage performance incentives to AWW, providing greater 
nutritional options and diversity in the meals provided and setting up “model” AWCs with 
renovated buildings, toys and supplies for children’s play and education (Government of India, 
2013; Maestre & Poole, 2018; The World Bank, 2006). Given this diversity of experience in 
implementation, there can be critical lessons to be learned for underperforming states through the 
initiatives adopted in better performing states. 
 
4.3 Nutrition Rehabilitation Centers (NRC) 
As a far more recent program, and one that operates within hospital facilities, very few studies 
have looked at the institutional or governance challenges that exist in NRCs. Most of the work on 
facility-based management of SAM in India has focused on clinical and anthropometric outcomes 
of such treatment in different states, including Madhya Pradesh (Aguayo et al., 2015; George et 
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al., 2017), Jharkhand (Chaturvedi et al., 2018), Uttar Pradesh (Singh et al., 2014) and cross-state 
studies (Dasgupta et al., 2014; R. Gupta & Sharma, 2015). Select works have attempted to go 
beyond the immediate outcomes of NRC admission to examine the longer term impacts upon being 
discharged from such facilities to find poor rate of follow-ups (Pandey et al., 2018). Other work 
also identifies circumstances that may have led to the onset of SAM, such as conditions at the 
child’s home and access to supplementary nutrition and feeding programs (Chaturvedi et al., 
2018). Other researchers have tried to explore design limitations of the existing NRC model 
(Dasgupta et al., 2014) and further outward to the scope for community-based management 
(Alvarez Morán et al., 2018; Burza et al., 2015). Overall, the literature indicates that while NRCs 
are effective in treating the immediate symptoms of SAM, sustaining practices once discharged is 
very difficult for the patients and their families (Taneja et al., 2012). 
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5. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
5.1 Study Rationale 
This study adopts a comparative case study approach to explore the changing landscape of food 
and nutrition policy in India, both from the top-down perspective of administrators as well as the 
bottom-up experience of beneficiaries of nutrition services. Taking the passage of the NFSA as a 
starting point, this work examines the impact of the Act on the implementation of the Targeted 
Public Distribution System (TPDS) and the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS). 
Furthermore, to better understand the pathways to nutrition deprivation, we study the operation of 
and experiences at nutrition rehabilitation centers (NRC).  
Using positive deviance to compare districts with contrasting performance in improving 
child nutrition outcomes, the objective is to look at how governance challenges have been 
addressed in different Indian settings. Positive deviance (PD) is a research approach to behavioral 
and social change based on the observation that in any community there are people whose 
uncommon but successful behaviors or strategies enable them to find better solutions to a problem 
than their peers, despite being in similar socio-economic strata (Levinson et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, these lessons can prove fruitful in adopting or scaling up reforms and better 
understand institutional functioning of large-scale national programs. 
 
5.2 Selection of Study Sites 
Performance on food security, nutrition and wellbeing vary dramatically across India as evident in 
Table 5.1. Consequently, different states have highly disparate starting points for the purpose of a 
comparative study. This led to the selection of study sites from the Empowered Action Group 
(EAG), which includes the states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, 
Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh. This grouping of states has its origins in the mid-1980s when demographer 
Ashish Bose identified many of these states falling behind other states of the country on various 
demographic indicators, such as infant and child mortality (Mishra & Mishra, 2018). Though initially a call 
to policy makers on the need to bridge the demographic gap between states in India, it also drew attention 
to how the economic backwardness of these states was plummeting the national growth rate (Som & Mishra, 
2014). In 2001, the EAG was formed to address the substantial lag in social, health and development 
indicators in these states (Arokiasamy & Gautam, 2008). 
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Narrowing the selection to EAG states, this study used the most recent available data on 
severe stunting among children aged 0-59 months (children whose height for age is below 3 
standard deviations from the reference population). Stunting reflects chronic undernutrition during 
the most critical periods of growth and development in early life (Vikram, 2018), and the National 
Food Security Act 2013 stipulates among its aims a reduction in the 48.2 million stunted children, 
the highest in the world. 
The state and districts were selected using three secondary data sources: the National 
Family Health Survey 2005-06 (International Institute for Population Sciences 2007), the Rapid 
Survey on Children 2013-14 (UNICEF 2014) and the Annual Health Survey 2014 (Ministry of 
Home Affairs 2014). At the time of conceptualization of this study, these three were the latest 
available datasets measuring state-wise trends in stunting, whereas district-wise estimates on 
stunting were available in the 2014 Annual Health Survey (AHS). The National Family Health 
Survey (NFHS), Rapid Survey on Children (RSoC), and AHS are regularly used by federal and 
state governments to prepare social and healthcare policy (Dandona et al. 2016). 
Two districts each in Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand, as well as the country’s capital of 
New Delhi (officially the National Capital Territory of Delhi, NCT), were selected for carrying 
out this study. New Delhi was selected exclusively to gauge the functioning of the grievance 
redressal mechanism as the capital was a critical stage of the right to food movement, and as per 
the 2015 report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, it appeared to have some level of 
operations or appointments in each tier of the grievance redressal process (Comptroller and 
Auditor General of India, 2015). 
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Table 5.1: Severe Stunting (-3 SD) in India, and its relative change 
between 2005-06 and 2013-14   
State 
2013-14 
(RSoC) 
2005-06 
(NFHS 3) 
Relative 
change* 
Andhra Pradesh 12.1 18.7 -35.3 
Arunachal Pradesh 19.6 21.7 -9.7 
Assam 21.0 20.9 0.5 
Bihar 26.1 29.1 -10.3 
Chhattisgarh 16.4 24.8 -33.9 
Delhi 14.1 20.4 -30.9 
Goa 6.6 10.2 -35.3 
Gujarat 18.5 25.5 -27.5 
Haryana 19.3 19.4 -0.5 
Himachal Pradesh 16.1 16 0.6 
Jammu & Kashmir 12.8 14.9 -14.1 
Jharkhand 23.6 26.8 -11.9 
Karnataka 15.2 20.5 -25.9 
Kerala 7.9 6.5 21.5 
Madhya Pradesh 18.5 26.3 -29.7 
Maharashtra 10.1 19.1 -47.1 
Manipur 12.6 13.1 -3.8 
Meghalaya 29.4 29.8 -1.3 
Mizoram 15.3 17.7 -13.6 
Nagaland 15.8 19.3 -18.1 
Odisha 15.5 19.6 -20.9 
Punjab 13.1 17.3 -24.3 
Rajasthan 17.3 22.7 -23.8 
Sikkim 11.0 17.9 -38.5 
Tamil Nadu 9.4 10.9 -13.8 
Tripura 15.0 14.7 2.0 
Uttar Pradesh 28.6 32.4 -11.7 
Uttarakhand 13.8 23.1 -40.3 
West Bengal 12.8 17.8 -28.1 
All-India 17.4 23.7 -26.6 
NFHS: National Family Health Survey; SD: Standard Deviation 
*Calculated as relative change = ((final period %/period 1 %) -1)*100 
(Highlighted states are Empowered Action Group states)  
 
Table 5.1 shows that in 2005-06 Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand performed similarly on severe 
stunting prevalence with 26.3% and 26.8%, respectively. By 2013-14, Madhya Pradesh witnessed 
a 29.7% reduction in severe stunting, making it the third highest reduction among the EAG states, 
while Jharkhand saw a reduction of 11.9%, placing it in the bottom three. Stunting data was used 
37 
 
as a proxy for nutrition status as it is a better indicator of chronic undernutrition of children, often 
reflecting poor socioeconomic conditions and inadequate health and nutrition of the mother and/or 
child (von Grebmer et al., 2015; World Health Organization, 2020). 
 
Figure 5.1: Study sites 
 
 
The next step was to select districts in Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand. In both states, an attempt 
was made to identify districts with contrasting levels of stunting for children under the age of five 
based on AHS 2014. In both states, one district was selected from both ends of the spectrum, as 
highlighted in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. These districts will hereafter be JH1 and MP1 for the better 
performing districts in each state, and JH2 and MP2 for the poorer performing districts, to preserve 
the anonymity of respondents working in these districts. The district selection was guided by the 
positive deviance approach stated earlier where selecting districts with contrasting performance 
might offer lessons and better understanding on the disparate implementation of food security 
programs.  
38 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Prevalence of stunting (-2 SD) by district in Jharkhand, AHS 2014 
 
Figure 5.3: Prevalence of stunting (-2 SD) by district in Madhya Pradesh, AHS, 2014 
 
 
5.3 Participants and Data Collection 
5.3.1 Targeted Public Distribution System (PDS) 
A series of interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) were conducted to obtain information 
regarding the procurement, distribution and management of the TPDS. The stakeholders 
interviewed included government officials administering the program, fair price shop (FPS) 
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owners and beneficiaries. A brief overview of the participants interviewed is provided in Table 
5.2. The consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research (COREQ), a 32-item checklist 
for interviews and focus groups, were maintained to collect the data (Tong et al., 2007). Potential 
participants were identified through different sources: (1) key informants working on food security 
and nutrition in India (i.e. civil society organizations and government administrators); (2) literature 
relating to nutrition in India were used to identify the range of key individuals and institutions; and 
(3) snowball sampling, where respondents were asked to identify potential participants for the 
study. Aside from interviews and FGDs, a process net-mapping exercise was also conducted. 
 
Table 5.2: Study Participants and Methods       
  Jharkhand Madhya Pradesh 
New Delhi 
  JH1 JH2 MP1 MP2 
Method           
Key 
Informant 
Interview 
Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate (1) 
District 
Magistrate (1) 
District 
Program 
Officer, ICDS 
(1) 
District Supply 
Officer/Assistant 
(1) 
Additional 
District 
Magistrate (2) 
Grain Warehouse 
Assistant 
Manager (1) 
 District Social 
Welfare Officer 
(1) 
Lady 
Supervisor, 
ICDS (1) 
  
Civil Society 
(3) 
District 
Development 
Officer (1) 
Grain Warehouse 
Manager (1) 
Acting District 
Supply Officer 
Sarpanch (1) Beneficiaries 
with 
grievances (17) 
Medical Officer-
In-Charge, NRC (2) 
Lady Supervisor, 
ICDS (1) 
Nurse (2) Nurse (2) 
  
Auxiliary Nurse 
Midwife (3)  
Auxiliary Nurse 
Midwife (3) 
Feeding 
Demonstrator 
(2) 
Feeding 
Demonstrator (2)   
  Civil Society (2) Medical Officer 
In Charge (2) 
Medical Officer 
In Charge (2) 
  
Net-
Mapping 
Exercise 
Women’s SHG 
(3) 
Women's SHG 
(3) 
Agricultural 
Cooperative 
FPS (3) 
Agricultural 
Cooperative FPS 
(3) 
  
Male-run FPS (1) Male-run FPS (1)       
AWW (3), Model 
AWC (1) 
AWW (3), Model 
AWC (1) 
AWW (3) AWW (3) 
  
Focus 
group 
discussion 
(FGD) 
Beneficiaries (4): 
three with 6 
participants, one 
with 7 
participants  
Beneficiaries (4): 
each with 8 
participants 
Beneficiaries 
(3); two  with 
6, one with 7 
Beneficiaries (3); 
each with 6 
  
Note: Number in parentheses indicates the count of interviews/ net-mapping exercises / FGDs   
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Process-influence mapping is a participatory mapping technique based on the Net-Map tool 
(Schiffer & Hauck, 2010). Process-influence mapping combines elements of various tools that 
have been developed to analyze stakeholder interaction and political processes. The technique can 
be used in interviews with individuals or groups and involves three main steps: (1) mapping all 
stakeholders or actors involved in a particular process of food and nutrition service delivery; (2) 
drawing a flow chart of the different steps involved in the process; and (3) ranking the influence 
of different actors in the process using a visual aid, such as checkers or carom board pieces. The 
result is a three-dimensional map, which serves as a roadmap for further discussions with the 
interviewees. The maps can then be used to identify problems in the functioning of food security 
programs and identify entry points for overcoming these problems. 
For the TPDS, the process net-mapping exercise was conducted exclusively with FPS 
dealers as they hold a unique role in the interface between the larger administrative players in the 
distribution of food grains and the actual public or beneficiary. Snow-ball sampling here was 
essential for two reasons: 1) it helped to approach dealers with whom a personal contact could be 
found to establish a foundation of trust and confidentiality; and 2) in the case of Jharkhand, finding 
actual FPS that were run by women rather than just registered in name required local knowledge 
of SHGs and the state of their operations. 
Though a rigorous attempt was made to reach out to the desired respondents, in the case of 
government officials this was not always possible due to scheduling issues or unavailability. If the 
appropriate authority denied an interview, an attempt was made to interview the successive deputy 
in the same department. According to the standard qualitative survey guidelines, the survey on a 
particular theme continued until adequate (large enough for replication to occur and be noted) and 
appropriate (those interviewed must be experts in the phenomenon of interest) participants were 
interviewed (Morse, 2015). 
 
5.3.2 Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) 
A series of key informant interviews and FGDs were conducted to understand the procurement, 
distribution and implementation of food and nutrition services under the ICDS as well. The ICDS 
provides two types of nutrition services: the first is a hot cooked meal at the AWC through which 
all services for mothers and children operate; and the second is distribution of packets of nutritious 
foods for expectant mothers, lactating women and children. Snowball sampling was used to 
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identify and interview AWWs in rural settings of the selected districts who felt comfortable 
disclosing sensitive information on the workings of the program. In addition to AWWs, 
government officials and administrative staff overseeing the ICDS were also interviewed as listed 
in Figure 5.2. Finally, beneficiaries of the identified AWCs were also interviewed to assess their 
satisfaction with AWC operations and gather feedback on the services offered. Ten beneficiaries 
were randomly selected using registry information from the respective AWC, keeping in mind that 
all 10 members might not attend due to various household and farming activities. Once six of the 
selected members of the community were present the FGD was conducted. 
In order to break down the workings of the ICDS, an institutional net-mapping exercise 
was conducted with every participating AWW. AWWs were selected for this exercise because 
they are a nodal point in the provision of ICDS services, having to interact with government 
officials and administrators, as well as the general public, making them uniquely positioned to give 
a holistic account on the spectrum of actors and processes involved. 
In the case of this study, when trying to map out the delivery and distribution of the take 
home ration (THR) packets, the AWW was asked, “When did the THR packets arrive?” Using this 
event as a reference, the question is followed up with, “In order for these packets to arrive on said 
date, what was the first thing you had to do this past month?” Like this, each step and actor along 
the AWW’s path for procurement and distribution are visually mapped on chart paper. The second 
phase of the exercise is to ask the respondents to rate the influence or power of each actor that has 
been identified and mapped on a given outcome (e.g. the procurement and distribution of THR). 
In this study, the scale for rating the influence levels ranged from zero (no influence) to six (most 
influence). Stackable objects, in this case checkers pieces, are used to visualize the varying 
influence of different actors. The respondent is then asked to explain the reasons for the influence 
level they have attributed to each actor. Phase three of this exercise examines governance 
challenges in the web of implementation, often abstracting governance problems rather than citing 
individual cases of such problems. This is partly to remain sensitive to the difficulty that many 
respondents experience in divulging personal experiences to researchers. The fourth and final 
phase asks the respondent to look at the map before them and give feedback based on their 
experience to tackle the challenges discussed. 
In addition to the process net-mapping exercise, matrix ranking was done with beneficiaries 
in their FGD to identify which ICDS services were most important to them. To do this, a chart was 
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prepared with a pictographic representation of the six core ICDS services, which were also 
explained to the assembled beneficiaries. In the course of the FGD, the chart was placed in the 
middle and each mother was asked to identify which service she found to be the most important 
for her and her child. Each mother was given a checker to place on the map as they deemed fit, 
and once this exercise was complete, the checker pieces were tallied. This was then used to fuel 
further conversation on why certain services were deemed more or less important than others. 
 
5.3.3 Nutrition Rehabilitation Centers (NRC) 
Case Studies  
Within each state, two districts were selected using stunting data from the Annual Health Survey 
2014, with one district in each state being a relatively high-performing district (i.e. low stunting 
rates) compared to the other district (i.e. high stunting rates) to allow for both inter- and intra-state 
differences in the implementation of the programs of interest. In each district, a minimum of two 
NRCs were visited, with a subsequent NRC only visited if there were no admitted patients at the 
visited NRC (malnutrition treatment centers, MTC, in Jharkhand).  
In Jharkhand, NRCs do not exist in each block of the district. In JH1 and JH2, all 6 MTCs 
in both districts were visited. In Madhya Pradesh, two NRCs were visited in each district, one in 
the district headquarters as this is the largest NRC with 20 beds, and one additional NRC in a 
neighboring block. In Jharkhand, these visits were conducted between September and October 
2016, while in Madhya Pradesh these visits were conducted from November 2016 to January 2017. 
In addition to admitted mothers and children at NRCs, follow-up visits were conducted 
with patients who had been discharged six months prior from each facility. Six months was used 
as an adequate time frame to assess how the time spent in the NRC/MTC had impacted the mother 
and the care of the child since leaving the NRC. Mothers/patients were selected purposively, but 
households were visited in the chronological order that they were admitted six months prior. 
A series of qualitative tools were used to pursue these objectives, including key informant 
interviews with the nursing staff at the NRC/MTC and with the medical officer-in-charge (MOIC). 
A minimum of two days was spent at each NRC with patients, conducting participant observation 
between the hours of 9:30 AM till 4 PM to examine the interactions between the staff and patients, 
as well as observe the various activities at the facility. Finally, in-depth interviews were conducted 
with mothers at the NRC/MTC regarding the health history of the child, as well as their experience 
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at the MTC/NRC. In the follow-up case interviews, an effort was made to include both parents of 
the child in the interview so as to see how their understanding or care of the child has changed 
since being discharged from the facility, as well as to assess what challenges remain. The primary 
goal of these interviews was to inquire as to the parents’ understanding of the holistic nature of 
nutrition, as well as the role of nutrition programs, such as the ICDS and the TPDS in supporting 
food security. 
 
5.4 Data Analysis 
Aside from the process net-mapping analysis, standard methods of qualitative data analysis 
through interviews and FGD were followed to attain the study objectives. The verbatim responses 
obtained from the FGDs were translated into English. To nullify the effect of intra-observer and 
inter-observer reproducibility, two level translation processes were opted. In the first stage, two 
independent field assistants who were native speakers of the local language, translated the 
responses to English. In the second stage, one researcher with a similar educational background 
randomly checked 60% of the translated FGDs. The accuracy of the transcribed responses was 
verified and approved for research. An excel database spreadsheet was developed to code the 
response of different categories attached to the participant’s unique identification number. The 
comments and the common categories of the responses were sorted, and findings were summarized 
for each subcategory, noting similarities and differences across groups. 
 
5.5 Quality Assurance 
The verbatim responses obtained were translated into English by the author with the aid of local 
field assistants. An excel database spreadsheet was developed to code the response of different 
categories and appropriate themes were identified. After all the verbatim interviews were coded, 
the common categories of the responses were sorted. In the next step, themes were mapped to the 
theoretical framework developed for this study, allowing further exploration of the degree to which 
the data supported the framework.  
Triangulation to assure the data quality and establish their validity was done through 
qualitative review of peer-reviewed and grey literature including research articles, government 
policy documents, national surveys, donor reports and newspaper articles relating to the TPDS, 
ICDS, NRCs, child nutrition and the policy process from 1975 to 2016. Furthermore, the diverse 
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qualitative methods used with stakeholders both on the supply and demand-side allowed for 
corroboration between respondents. Such triangulation tests for consistency helped reduce bias 
and thus enhance the quality of analysis (Patton, 1999). 
 
5.6 Ethical Considerations 
All participants were given a thorough explanation of the nature of this study, its objectives and 
its lack of affiliation with any government office. From all participants, an informed oral consent 
was obtained prior to an interview or exchange. Once data were compiled and made available for 
analysis, any participant identifiers were removed to maintain anonymity. This study also rendered 
special care while collecting the information on governance challenges from officials working with 
the Indian government. Apart from ensuring the anonymity of respondents, before conducting 
interviews they were told that they could terminate the interview at any time or choose not to 
respond to certain questions if uncomfortable. However, they were informed about the value of 
their contribution to the study, particularly for practitioners and policy makers unaware of the 
ground realities. This method helped improve the data quality, and the compliance rate of the 
study. Participants were asked if they would like the research to be shared once it is finalized and 
published. All participants approved the information collected be used for research purposes, 
provided the anonymity of responses is maintained. 
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6. THE TARGETED PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (TPDS) 
6.1 NFSA and TPDS Reforms 
Of the initiatives listed under the NFSA, the TPDS gets the greatest attention with concrete 
program reforms to improve its performance and accountability (Government of India, 2013). The 
TPDS has long suffered from several governance challenges, including inclusion and exclusion 
errors, leakages and pilferage, and poor quality of subsidized grains (Rai et al, 2014). The NFSA 
prescribes specific institutional reforms for the TPDS: a push for greater participation of 
community-based organizations in distributing subsidized grains, such as women’s self-help 
groups (SHGs) and cooperatives; the use of technology, and the establishment of a tiered grievance 
redressal mechanism. Using a series of qualitative methods and an empirical comparative case 
study approach, we map out the persistent gaps and prospects in the implementation of the TPDS 
since the passage of the NFSA. 
 
6.2 Results 
A total of 14 process net-maps have been aggregated across four districts of Jharkhand and Madhya 
Pradesh, two in each. The findings of the process net-maps were further supplemented and 
triangulated with information gathered through in-depth interviews with key administrative 
officials as well as focus group discussions (FGD) with beneficiaries of the TPDS in each district. 
 
6.2.1 Process Overview – Jharkhand  
The process net-map for Jharkhand is depicted in Figure 6.1. In analyzing the 8 net-maps, it 
becomes evident across the various fair price shop (FPS) owners that there are both formal and 
informal operations in play. The focus in Jharkhand was on capturing the experiences of the most 
prevalent community-based group, women’s self-help groups (SHGs), running the FPS as a key 
institutional reform stipulated under the NFSA. For each interview, the SHG members present 
were asked: What is your first step in procuring food grains for the coming month? (Alternatively: 
What was your first step in procuring this past month’s food grains?) 
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Figure 6.1: Process net-map for Jharkhand TPDS 
 
The first step entails the women’s SHG transferring funds at their local bank (often a Bank of India 
account) to purchase the allotment of grains for the next month (Step 1). In many cases where the 
women’s groups were initially unfamiliar with the forms required for the transfer of funds, they 
would be directed by the Marketing Officer (MO), who oversees the TPDS at the block level, to 
an assistant identified as the “MO Attendant” (Step 1 dashed). In speaking with administrative 
officials at the district-level, no mention was made of such a position having any role in the TPDS 
distribution process in an official capacity. Most of the women’s SHGs would have to pay the MO 
Attendant INR 200 (~ EUR 2.50) and upwards to aid in completing the wire transfer forms. FPS 
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where a male relative or employee supported the operations often avoided this fee as they had prior 
knowledge and felt comfortable completing the forms themselves. Once the funds are transferred 
(Step 2 and 3), another fee is paid to the MO Attendant (Step 4) to travel to the neighboring district 
Food Corporation of India (FCI) go-down. Here the fund transfer receipt is stamped and the MO 
Attendant returns to the local block storage facility to submit the stamped receipt (Steps 5, 6, 7). 
Hereafter begins the wait for the actual grains to arrive in the block warehouse, local known 
as “go-down.” While one FPS owner (a male relative of the SHG President and Secretary who 
actually runs the day-to-day operations) indicated that he receives text messages from the 
Jharkhand State Food and Civil Supplies (JSFCS) office informing the arrival of the FPS’s grains 
for collection, most of the women FPS dealers indicated that they had to either travel to the local 
go-down as many as seven to eight times to check on the arrival of the grains, or they would receive 
a phone call from the MO or Assistant Manager at the block go-down. SHGs with shops an hour 
or more away from the block go-down reported that they would be listed further down on the 
allocation list which often delays the distribution of their allotted food grains each month. 
In order to collect the food grains, the head of the SHG, or the male relative supporting the 
FPS operations, along with the SHG Treasurer and any other members who wish to be present, 
must go to the go-down. As per the interview with the Assistant Manager of the local go-down, 
the SHG members are required to bring their record of transactions for the previous month and 
upon review, the Assistant Manager approves the collection of the current month’s allotment by 
means of an electronic tablet to manage the flow of grains of the FCI/TPDS supply chain (Step 8). 
The Transport Contractor, also present at the time of collection, assigns the goods to a designated 
truck for same-day delivery (Step 8). The workers at the go-down collect and weigh the grains as 
per the quantity read out by the Transport Contractor and load it on the truck, though in most go-
downs visited, there was no electronic scale used that would allow all parties present to verify the 
quantity being loaded. 
All the FPS owners reported that they made payments to all individuals at the go-down: 
the Assistant Manager (Step 9), the Transport Contractor (Step 10), the worker loading the trucks 
(Step 11), and the truck driver himself (Step 12), ranging in amount from INR 100 to INR 300 
(~EUR 1-3) per person. Even in cases where SHG members did not think that their collection of 
food grains would be jeopardized by withholding payment, they felt a system and culture had 
already been created that they could not eschew. 
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Once the trucks deliver the grains to the FPS, news of the grains’ arrival is disseminated 
through an informal network of contacts and neighbors and the sale phase commences. The 
delivery trucks usually carry the banner of their destination FPS and any member of the public can 
spot the arrival and transport of the grains. In all the FPS where women fully managed operations, 
the grains were stored and distributed from their homes located within the community. This 
allowed for more regular hours of operation and accessibility for beneficiaries to collect their 
grains. For collection of grain entitlements, any member of the beneficiary household could present 
the household ration card at the FPS and pay the subsidized rate of INR 1 per kilogram of rice and 
wheat. 
 
6.2.2 Process Overview - Madhya Pradesh 
The process net-map for TPDS operations in Madhya Pradesh is presented in Figure 6.2. In the 
Madhya Pradesh setting, the most prominent difference in the functioning of the FPS was that they 
are overwhelmingly managed by male-run agricultural cooperative societies. Despite efforts to 
track down women-run FPS, none could be located or identified in the communities visited. The 
District Supply Officer in MP1 indicated that the government was aiming to increase participation 
of women SHGs in FPS operations to as much as one-third, but provided no specific time frame. 
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Figure 6.2: Process net-map for Madhya Pradesh TPDS 
 
A second key difference was that unlike Jharkhand, the digitization of the TPDS had reached the 
FPS level and had been in operation for a year prior to this study. The impact of this change is 
visible in the process net-map as there is a clear reduction of steps in the operation of the FPS and 
less interaction with intermediaries in acquiring food grains. FPS dealers were asked the same 
series of questions as in Jharkhand as to the steps required to obtain grains for the current or coming 
month’s sales. 
As in Jharkhand, operations are initiated with a bank transfer for which the FPS dealer 
receives a receipt and confirmation of the transfer order (“challan”). A monthly report is given to 
the Head of the Agricultural Cooperative Society on grain distribution and stocks, which is signed 
by the Society Manager (Steps 2 and 3). The FPS dealer retains a copy of the initial transfer order. 
Then the FPS dealer awaits a text message from the Madhya Pradesh Food and State Civil Supplies 
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(MPFSCS) with confirmation of the coming month’s allotment (Step 4). On the day of delivery, 
the Transport Contractor communicates to the FPS operator, and the goods are delivered to the 
FPS by truck; upon arrival, the FPS operator signs a delivery order, retaining one copy (Steps 5 
and 6). In addition to the visible arrival of the truck to the FPS, beneficiaries are notified by word 
of mouth of the arrival of food grains to the FPS, and the FPS operator also informs the Village 
Messenger who can further disseminate this news (Step 7). Beneficiaries can then come on 
designated days to collect their grain entitlements by presenting their TPDS card, and the FPS 
operator updates the stock and sales registers (Step 8). Some FPS operators indicated that if a 
beneficiary does not lift their allotment of grains for a given month, they can save it for them for 
a period of up to two months. At month’s end, the Junior Supply Officer or Food Inspector will 
request to meet with the FPS dealer to cross-check the records with the EPOS machine, and all 
information is uploaded online in real-time (Steps 9 and 10). A notable difference between 
Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh is that FPS dealers in rural areas are paid monthly salaries in 
Madhya Pradesh of INR 7700 (~EUR 90) for the first FPS they manage and Rs. 500 (~EUR 6) for 
each additional FPS managed. Urban FPS dealers earn on a commission basis, much like their 
counterparts in Jharkhand. 
 
6.2.3 NFSA Reforms in Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh 
State of Community-Based Management 
The greater inclusion of community-based groups can be seen as both a demand and supply side 
measure to improve the governance of the TPDS. However, as the process net-maps show, the 
inclusion of such groups has not entirely curbed the leakage of grains. In the case of Jharkhand, 
there are three major gaps in the implementation of this reform. The first is that many women’s 
SHGs only exist on paper, and their FPS is operated by male relatives. Consequently, profits of 
FPS operations accrued to those members of the SHG who are family members. Other members 
of the group had little involvement in the FPS operations and occasionally received a small portion 
of grains at the discretion of the SHG leaders and their male relative. Additionally, interviews with 
district officials and local NGOs revealed that this practice of male-run female SHGs is an open 
secret. In the preceding seven years, Jharkhand has been giving priority to women’s SHGs for 
FPS, and as a result, many men have registered SHGs under the names of female family members 
to gain FPS licenses. Hence the intended benefit of having community-based organizations 
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working as a group for the good of the public and being better held accountable by their own 
community has been irregular. 
Even among FPS where women ran the FPS operations, a second major gap arose from the 
various costs that continue to exist for FPS beyond their regular operating costs. These costs are a 
result of the longstanding chain of corruption where various officers and middlemen across the 
chain of command expect some form of remuneration. In Jharkhand, exploitation of these SHGs 
arises with the Marketing Officer (MO) and also indirectly with the Lady Extension Officer (LEO). 
At the time of these interviews, the Jharkhand TPDS was only digitized up to the point of 
distribution at the go-down, however even this process is controlled by an officer who must sign 
off electronically on an FPS’ grain allotment. All the SHGs reported that the MO expected a set 
payment on a monthly basis when they arrived at the go-down facility, using the review of their 
records and transactions as a cover to demand payment before the go-down heads release the 
goods. These payments ranged from INR 1000 to INR 3000 (~EUR 11- EUR 35) in our findings, 
with some FPS owners indicating that earlier some officials requested a percentage cut of monthly 
profits; these sums account for as much as 25 percent of monthly earnings. 
In Jharkhand, the LEOs formally work under the District Development Officer (DDO) and 
are employed to support SHGs. For many SHGs, the LEO played a pivotal role in availing 
resources or information, as well as in applying for an FPS license. However this often came at 
the cost of signing up for agricultural loans, on which these LEOs can earn either a commission or 
extract a payment. These loans while very appealing, could also be a focal point for discord within 
SHGs, often straining the relations between members. Once received, the challenge of repaying 
the monthly installments of these loans and nominal earnings through the FPS would force these 
groups to make cuts in distribution at the time of sale. One SHG reported that due to the backlog 
of loan payments, they not only had to dismantle their SHG due to internal conflict, but they sold 
off an entire month’s worth of TPDS rations, an incident that was corroborated by an FGD with 
the community members. 
A third gap in the experience of many Jharkhand SHGs was the inequity within the SHGs 
themselves. Even when male acquaintances are not running the FPS, the store operations involve 
at most three to four members of a ten member SHG. Greater participation of other women 
members was also hampered by the prevalence of low literacy and little time as many women were 
laborers. In cases where only one or two women are literate, the profit of the FPS would accrue to 
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them as they felt they bore the burden of running the PDS, while distributing any remaining food 
grains among the members at the end of the month. There were also cases where an SHG was 
registered under one member, and as a result, this individual would demand a set amount of grains 
every month in order to maintain the registration or book-keeping of the FPS, creating additional 
loss for the other members of the SHG. 
Most SHGs admitted to selling off excess rations and also swiping anywhere from one to 
four kilos per card, depending on the number of beneficiaries. Community members corroborated 
these diversions in grains, justifying their lack of protest either because they understood the 
financial constraints of the FPS (e.g. various bribes and financial burdens) or because they felt 
discomfort at confronting a member of their own community over a few kilograms of grains. The 
FPS also admitted to problems with the current list of beneficiaries, with various exclusion and 
inclusion errors that have been a long-standing criticism of the TPDS program. As this study was 
conducted prior to the implementation of the EPOS in Jharkhand, most FPS owners still had some 
discretion in how they distributed food grains. For example, at one FPS there was a widow present 
whose name had been left off the TPDS list but another name had appeared with a striking 
resemblance to hers with no claimant to the grains. Hence the FPS owner diverted the unclaimed 
grains to the widow since she knew her as someone who would normally be eligible for the grain 
entitlement but was likely excluded due to a clerical error. Similarly, FPS owners when rooted in 
the community know who should not be entitled to grains and this opens space for unclaimed 
grains to be sold on the private market by the shop owners for 15 to 20 times the rate at which they 
sell to beneficiaries. This came to light in Madhya Pradesh as well, where several dealers have 
been running FPS for decades and know which households should be eligible. In cases where there 
is an inclusion error, rather than report the error to the authorities, the dealer would continue to 
sell the grains to the beneficiary however at an inflated rate so as to earn a profit but still below 
market rates; this provides a win-win for the falsely included beneficiary and the dealer. 
Ultimately, these findings indicate that while the presence of community-based groups 
such as SHGs in Jharkhand helped ease access to FPS grains, it did not completely curb the 
problem of pilferage. One reason for this is the larger system of corruption and pressure that is 
applied on these groups through diverse administrative officials, both directly (monthly payments) 
and/or indirectly (forced to take loans or risk license). A second reason is that internal SHG 
dynamics can compel group members to steal grains from beneficiaries to recoup costs or 
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compensate fellow members; a single member can also take advantage of the system as they claim 
the greatest investment in the operations. Consequently, the beneficiary is still sold less grains 
even though many of the beneficiaries seemed empathetic to the constraints on the SHGs. 
  
Use of Technology 
A key supply-side measure in the reforms under the NFSA was the adoption of technology in 
TPDS operations. As noted earlier, at the time of this study the TPDS in Jharkhand had been 
computerized up to the block-level go-down and the EPOS had only just been introduced at a large 
scale in the state. From the beneficiary perspective, the computerization of the grain distribution 
channels did not appear to have made much impact for their day-to-day, though technically they 
should be able to view their TPDS entitlement online. For the FPS dealers, computerization at the 
time did not seem to have made any significant changes since daily operations were still managed 
by hand and needed to be submitted in person to the MO or other administrator. Dealers expressed 
significant concerns over the introduction of the EPOS. In a block go-down in JH1 as a group of 
dealers (all men) arrived to pick up their grains, one declared: “We are going to return our licenses 
once this EPOS is introduced. We cannot do business this way -- it’s more trouble than it is worth.” 
Many of the SHGs in the process net-mapping exercise also expressed how this would impact the 
beneficiaries: “Right now, anyone in the family can run over and take the ration. The adults are 
usually busy with work so usually they send children or a neighbor. Now this won’t be possible.” 
They also described how in rural Jharkhand, electricity and cellular connections are tenuous at 
best. These infrastructural limitations are bound to impede their ability to operate the TPDS and 
distribute rations. 
In contrast to Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh had a fully computerized TPDS which at the 
time of this study had been in operation for over a year. One of the immediate differences we see 
in the process net-maps of the two states are the fewer steps involved in the month-to-month 
operations as a result of the computerization. Most notably, many of the intermediaries are absent 
in the physical pick-up and distribution of the grains as FPS dealers are not required to physically 
come to the go-down. This can mean a reduction in costs/payments for dealers in terms of 
transportation to and from the go-down (including when checking on the arrival of grains) as well 
as payment for workers at the go-down for weighing and loading their allotment. There is also a 
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more functional automated system of notifying dealers upon the dispatching of food grains to the 
PDS that puts the pressure on the administrator instead of the individual dealer. 
As anticipated by many of the respondents in Jharkhand, the dealers in Madhya Pradesh 
did experience several challenges as a result of the technological improvements. The most 
pervasive problems in rural settings are that of electricity and cellular connection to operate the 
EPOS devices. Coupled with the fact that unlike in Jharkhand, FPS dealers are not regularly 
available to sell food grains as they operate multiple stores across villages and shift between stores 
from week to week, which puts the burden on the beneficiary to come to the FPS on the few days 
they open the store. In addition, one FPS dealer described how periodically he would upload the 
transaction data but this information would reset at the end of a month. It should be noted that even 
when making visits of an FPS in New Delhi, a similar issue came up where transactions with EPOS 
that fail due to irregularity in reading a fingerprint will actually register in government records as 
failure to pick up grains rather than a failure of the machine itself. These inconsistencies in how 
data is being recorded or tracked can fail to reflect that the problem is with the actual technology 
in use, not the failure of the beneficiary. 
Despite all these technological innovations, in Madhya Pradesh, as in Jharkhand, stock and 
sale registries are still meticulously maintained. All the FPS dealers reported that they would 
regularly have to visit government administrators. When asked what the need is to report to 
individual administrators on a regular basis when everything is electronically uploaded and 
registered, the respondents seemed hesitant to speak. One FPS operator in a peri-urban area of 
MP2 outlined the monthly payments he gives to various government officers overseeing the TPDS. 
He reported having to pay the head of his cooperative INR 1000 per month (~ EUR 12), INR 1500 
(~ EUR 18) to the Food Inspector, INR 5000 (~EUR 61) to the Assistant Food Controller, and INR 
8000 (~EUR 94) to the Food Controller. During the interview and mapping exercise with this FPS 
dealer, an individual drove up to the store and collected one quintile of grains and loaded it into an 
SUV, proof that despite the various technological advances, there continues an active leakage of 
grains from the TPDS chain. When asked where the FPS dealer procures this much money, he 
reported on some peculiarities in the way the TPDS is currently run. One is a recurring issue across 
both Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand, having to do with inclusion errors in the TPDS list of 
beneficiaries. Several dealers advised that as they are either based within the community or have 
been dealers for several years, they are aware of who is further up or down the socioeconomic 
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ladder in a community. Consequently, when many households were included as TPDS 
beneficiaries despite being above the economic threshold set for priority households, the dealer 
has some room to exploit this information. 
Another issue he raised is that even before arrival at the FPS, there are ways to manipulate 
the amount of food grains distributed. He described how the storage facilities where many of these 
supplies are kept are not secure and small ways of tampering can distort the weight of grains. He 
described: “Have you seen these go-downs? If you leave open the doors and windows and allow 
air, moisture and dirt to enter and circulate, it affects the weight of grains in the gunny sacks.” The 
buildup of even one hundred grams per sack can increase the weight of these grains substantially 
when multiplied by several hundred tons in a given storage facility. At this point, there is the entry 
point of various middle-men looking to take these grains, as described by a go-down manager in 
Jharkhand: “When I joined, I was approached by some middle-men (“dalal”) who were pushing 
that there should be some grains cut in the distribution to the FPS dealers, and they would take the 
extra. I could be in on the profits. I was harassed and threatened but once I took the name of the 
SDM (sub-divisional magistrate), they left me alone.” In this particular instance, the recent 
appointment of a young SDM had disrupted such misdemeanors in the operations of the TPDS, at 
least temporarily. However, this sheds light on how a long-running pattern of abuse and pilferage 
are still difficult to break. 
Even with the advent of technology in both states, there are limitations to the amount of 
corruption it can curb. While information is readily available to the public and there is potential to 
reduce intermediaries, as in the case of Madhya Pradesh, ultimately authorizations are granted for 
monthly distribution and licenses are issued through physical, human administrators. As these 
findings showed, even in Madhya Pradesh which has completely computerized to the point of 
sales, FPS dealers were still required to appear every month before administrative heads. 
Furthermore, all FPS dealers and beneficiaries cast doubt on the efficacy of the technological 
solutions, with many reporting glitches and incorrect reporting. 
 
Grievance Redressal Mechanism 
The crux of the demand-side reforms under the NFSA lies in the grievance redressal mechanism, 
which as this study and many others have found, has been woefully underemployed and often 
poorly implemented in the districts of this study. In Jharkhand, in none of the FGDs did we 
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encounter a beneficiary or individual who had successfully submitted a complaint regarding issues 
with their ration, omission of a name on the ration card (often children) or other lapse in the receipt 
of their entitlements. Most beneficiaries did not even know who the nodal point of contact was to 
file a complaint or grievance regarding their grain rations. What was more troubling was learning 
that the MO sits on the committee for grievance redressal, when as per the accounts of various 
dealers, he is part of the very problem that affects the distribution of grain entitlements to 
beneficiaries. 
 In Madhya Pradesh, interviews with the District Supply Officers (DSO) echoed the 
situation in Jharkhand, where technically there was a group of officers convened for grievance 
redressal, notably the DSO and District Magistrate. However, awareness among beneficiaries was 
minimal with respondents reporting that the first line of resolution would be the Sarpanch, the 
local village head. Unlike Jharkhand, however, respondents reported greater satisfaction with their 
ration card entitlements and distribution. 
 In New Delhi, a different approach has been pursued in the area of grievance redressal, 
with the aid of organizations like Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS: literally, “Vigilant Citizens’ 
Association”). From the month of August onward, SNS held a series Grievance Camps throughout 
Delhi, collecting grievances for a number of public services and programs from residents to 
officially submit to the respective authorities. Three Grievance Camps were attended to understand 
the problems most commonly faced by beneficiaries with regard to their ration. These grievances 
ranged from non-receipt of sugar, untimely operations of the FPS, reassignment of FPS to a more 
remote location, names of household members (often children) left off the ration cards, non-receipt 
of a ration card (in some cases, non-receipt after submitting the card for changes), and incorrect 
category of ration entitlements. After a three-month period, 17 complainants were followed up in 
three separate areas of Delhi, to see if any response had yet been received on their submitted 
grievance. None of them had received any response to their formal grievance to government 
officials in the three months prior to the interview. 
 Much has already been written and published regarding the failing of the grievance system 
in Delhi, most notably through the work of SNS (Bhatnagar, 2018b). After many efforts, an 
interview was conducted with an Additional District Magistrate in Delhi, who declared that while 
grievance hearings were conducted regarding breaches in ration entitlements and FPS 
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mismanagement, the key challenge was to convene all parties as beneficiaries often are unable to 
spare time to attend such hearings at the cost of a day’s work. 
 Thus the grievance redressal which was to give the NFSA its teeth, ultimately remains 
unenforced. Beneficiaries in both Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh seemed completely oblivious to 
such a mechanism, and most knew of no local officials they could approach. Furthermore, in both 
states, the grievance committees include the Marketing Officers that are often culprits in these 
larger lines of corruption. Without greater political will and greater push to educate the public 
about their rights and the relevant means to remedy their grievance, the NFSA in its current form 
has a diluted impact on curbing governance challenges. 
 
6.3 Discussion 
This study attempts to examine how the institutional and infrastructural recommendations 
stipulated under the NFSA 2013 have been operationalized in the years since its passage. Key 
among these reforms were the inclusion of community-based organizations as the agent of 
distribution to beneficiaries (FPS dealers), applying technological interventions to enhance 
transparency and a multi-level grievance redressal mechanism. The results of this study indicate a 
mixed outcome on all fronts and a resounding failure of the grievance mechanism in the states 
selected. 
 
The Limits of Community-Based Groups 
Firstly, the push towards increasing participation of community-based groups rather than private 
individuals in the administration of various welfare and livelihood programs is not new (Ramesh, 
2007). SHGs have been a central tool in raising participation and inclusion of women, and in the 
Indian context a strategic part of the government’s development agenda as evidenced in the Ninth 
Plan, 1997-2002 (Bali Swain & Wallentin, 2012). Even in documents submitted to the United 
Nations Human Rights Council for India’s candidature, women SHGs are listed as a means to 
“promote the social, economic and political empowerment of women” (Permanent Mission of 
India to the United Nations, 2011). Much of the literature examines SHGs within microfinance 
programs to understand their functioning, experiences and impact on reducing poverty, as taken 
up by national governments and international organizations alike (Patil & Kokate, 2017). In the 
Indian setting, SHGs have been proclaimed the largest network of community-based organizations 
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serving to both mitigate poverty as well as empower women (Reddy & Reddy, 2012). The effects 
of SHGs have been studied across a broad spectrum, ranging from improved nutritional outcomes 
(Deininger & Liu, 2013) and greater political participation (Ramesh, 2007), to household debt 
reduction and lower incidence of acute food deficit (Datta, 2015).  
Studies examining the role of SHGs outside the realm of microfinance, however, are far 
fewer. Much of the coverage of SHG performance and experiences with the TPDS has been 
disseminated through the national news media (Reddy, 2017; Staff Reporter, 2007). Several states 
that undertook institutional reforms of their TPDS from the mid-2000s onwards, notably 
Chhattisgarh, made deprivatization of FPS a priority to bolster accountability and transparency. 
Handing over FPS responsibilities to women’s groups was embraced for the dual purpose of 
perceived greater accountability by including community-based groups rather than private 
individuals, but also served to empower women and generate livelihood options that could bolster 
their own food and nutrition security. 
The current experience of women’s SHGs in the TPDS reflects problems at multiple levels 
with regard to operating the TPDS to ensure a steady and reliable stream of subsidized grains to 
beneficiaries. At the macro-level, we see two prevailing issues: 1) many of these groups are in fact 
only women-led or women-run in name with male relatives being responsible for the operations 
and earnings, and 2) women’s SHGs seemed vulnerable to various government administrators. 
 Findings from this study diverge from much of the existing literature on SHGs which often 
examine the economic, social and empowerment aspects of participation or interaction with SHGs, 
both for members and their communities. The core interest here was to examine the experience of 
SHGs in the implementation of a social welfare scheme, specifically the distribution of food grains. 
As Shah notes (2012), despite women traditionally being providers of food and nutrition in their 
communities, in the Indian context they have been largely missing from the public provisioning of 
food, especially the TPDS. In this sense, the experience observed in Jharkhand is a step toward a 
more inclusive system where women are present and hold leadership roles in the disbursement of 
food grains. Many beneficiaries also noted that the presence of women’s SHGs allowed greater 
ease of access to food as FPS are more locally embedded, reducing travel of long distances to the 
next available FPS.  
However, SHGs in this study still experience significant obstacles in fully executing their 
role in the TPDS. This study corroborates the findings of other work on the vulnerability of SHGs 
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to many of the social, cultural and institutional conditions in which they exist, whether it be 
asymmetry of power relations (Kalpana, 2008) that can make it difficult to obtain an FPS license 
or operate without hand-outs to various administrators, or the implicit take-over of their operations 
by male relatives, as has also been observed with availing of credit by male relatives in 
microfinance-focused SHGs (Guérin et al., 2013; Kalpana, 2008). 
The success of states like Chhattisgarh in turning around their TPDS was due in part to the 
deprivatization of FPS, but also leveraged various complementary reforms including strengthening 
local governance, building public awareness and expanding coverage (as in Madhya Pradesh) of 
beneficiaries (Ramaswami & Murugkar, 2013). This complementarity is essential for meeting the 
complex needs for such a large-scale distribution program. 
 
Technology – A Bane or a Boon? 
Technology as a tool to improve transparency and accountability has been widely documented 
especially in the provisioning of public programs like the TPDS (Hanna, 2017). The initiative of 
various states to computerize and incorporate technological solutions in administering public 
programs like the TPDS, inspired the inclusion of these reforms under the NFSA (Krishnamurthy 
et al., 2014). While technology can aid certain aspects of governance, notably enhancing 
transparency of records (Dev & Babu, 2016), technological interventions are not entirely 
autonomous and as the findings of this study show, gatekeepers remain that can subvert the system 
given the complexity of governance issues in the management of such programs (Dhaliwal & 
Hanna, 2017). Empirical studies have shown that transparency of information while a necessary 
condition is not a sufficient measure to yield accountability (Fox, 2007). 
Much of the discourse on the role of technology in provisioning of various public programs 
in India began as silver bullet solution to the gaps in the TPDS with particular attention paid to 
Chhattisgarh, which had extensively overhauled its distribution system through integrating end-
to-end computerization (Krishnamurthy et al., 2014; Rajan et al., 2016). This line of thinking was 
repeatedly encountered in the interviews with government administrators in both Madhya Pradesh 
and Jharkhand who extolled the power of technology to plug corruption and leakages through fake 
ration cards and accounts. However, for the FPS dealers, the implications of a technology driven 
system was far different.  
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The two study settings had very disparate progress on the technological front, with 
Jharkhand on the cusp of an EPOS system that would bring end-to-end computerization, and 
Madhya Pradesh having computerized its program from start to finish for over a year. The process 
net-map exercise clearly shows that technology would positively impact the issue of “middle-
men”, a classic problem in the case of such service provisioning. However, would this ultimately 
eliminate the issue of pilferage and leakages from the system? 
Several studies have examined the challenges in Jharkhand since the advent of the EPOS 
system, in particular the requirement of biometric information to collect grains (Drèze et al., 2017; 
Khera, 2017; Kohli et al., 2017). The problems that have ensued include failed biometric 
authentication, poor ICT infrastructure that slows down or entirely obstructs the EPOS 
functioning, and administrative glitches in how EPOS transactions are categorized (e.g. failure of 
authentication may still appear as a failure of the beneficiary to collect grains). As many academics 
and civil society actors have noted, while technology in theory can be an asset in the goals that the 
NFSA and state/central governments have etched out to boost accountability and transparency, in 
the interim the brunt of failing technologies is borne by the most vulnerable. Many studies, 
including this one, also note that ultimately the existence of EPOS also does not deter the leakage 
of grains at the beneficiary level since the dealers can still swipe one to two kilograms of grain per 
person, if not more. However, large-scale diversion, such as when an entire month’s allotment of 
grains was sold on the black market by an SHG to pay off loans, might be harder to achieve. 
The Jharkhand setting indicates that there are other competing pressures for women’s 
SHGs that compel them to divert from the beneficiary --- one of these being payments they have 
to make for various loan schemes, alongside payments to intermediaries like the MO. The first 
payment falls outside of the entire TPDS program itself and may be a gap that administrators fail 
to account for as motivating illegal activities and leakages of grains. Looking to Madhya Pradesh, 
the limitations of the technology were evident here as well in failures in the reading of biometric 
information, issues of connectivity and electricity, as well as issues of uploading data. However, 
fewer intermediaries in the operations meant less financial exploitation by middlemen, but higher 
up the chain of command, expectations remained of payments from the dealers. 
The 2004 World Development Report noted that service-delivery failures are 
accountability failures and etched out a “long” and “short” route to attaining accountability (World 
Bank, 2003). The long route includes elections and lobbying senior officials, while a short route 
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would establish direct links between users and providers of services. For this latter route, demand-
side initiatives to amplify voice and transparency have been pushed to the helm (Gaventa & Mcgee, 
2013) with technology as the vehicle for achieving these goals. However as Toyama (2015) notes, 
technology may in fact have an amplifier effect on existing intent and capacity of the stakeholders 
in a given system rather than replacing that pattern of behavior. For those who are not susceptible 
to shaming, such technological measures to improve transparency of the TPDS would yield limited 
pressure to improve service delivery (Fox, 2007; Peixoto & Fox, 2016). 
 
Grievance Redressal – The Missing Teeth of the NFSA 
As the main demand-side institutional mechanism for beneficiaries to lodge complaints and 
address irregularities with their TPDS entitlements, no beneficiaries interviewed in the three study 
regions had successfully availed the grievance redressal system. In Jharkhand, none of the 
beneficiaries interviewed in the FGDs knew the central point of contact for submitting their 
grievance. In Madhya Pradesh, though beneficiaries expressed fewer irregularities in receiving 
grain entitlements, there were still issues of accessibility of the FPS in terms of hours of operation 
and proximity to the store. Nonetheless, here too, the beneficiaries interviewed in the FGD did not 
know the appropriate authority to approach for their grievances, though for many their local village 
official, the Sarpanch, was a resource person to approach regarding their ration concerns. In Delhi 
there was considerable push by civil society organizations such as SNS to elicit grievances faced 
by beneficiaries and demand accountability on behalf of these beneficiaries from government 
authorities. However in following up on individual complaints submitted through SNS’ Grievance 
Camps, no one had received any response in the three months since filing their grievance. 
Much has already been written in the Indian media about the absence of a functional 
grievance redressal system across the country (Nayak & Nehra, 2017; Puri, 2017). Among the 
three states/territory studied, Delhi had the most visible effort to elicit grievances through civil 
society mobilization of communities to collect grievances. Despite these efforts, none of the 
complainants interviewed had received any intimation of their grievance in the months following 
their grievance filing. 
Grievance redressal is the most significant institutional demand-side provision that exists 
in the NFSA, offering an open channel for beneficiary voices and concerns to be passed up to 
administrators to improve the implementation of the TPDS. As part of the larger rights framework, 
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it is intended to transform both the operations of the state as well as its relations with those it serves 
(Aiyar & Walton, 2014). However, in three different settings, we see that despite its existence on 
paper, it has not been borne out with any consequence anywhere. This study corroborates other 
findings on the dysfunction or nonexistence of the grievance redressal system throughout the 
country (Bhatnagar, 2017; Department of Food and Public Distribution & Government of India, 
2015; Panigrahi & Pathak, 2015; Sinha & Patnaik, 2016). This is further muddled by the presence 
of individuals with conflicting interests tasked with adjudicating over violations of the NFSA, as 
in the cases of Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh in this study. 
 
6.4 Recommendations 
Within the last few years, reports have arisen of starvation deaths of children and women in both 
Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand (Bhatnagar, 2018a; Ranjan, 2018), despite the progress that both 
states have made in implementing reforms. While much of the focus has been placed on the use of 
biometric data and the Aadhaar program that have excluded eligible beneficiaries (Chatterji, 2017; 
Drèze et al., 2017; Sen, 2017), other critical problems persist in the operation of the TPDS 
including leveraging information asymmetry by local authorities or elites; skewed local dynamics 
of power; and the limitations of any technology in the presence of these two conditions.  
The NFSA’s supply-side governance reforms for the TPDS included the use of technology 
and recruiting community-based groups for delivery; the demand-side reform focused on creating 
a grievance redressal system to empower individual citizens. While technology can add 
convenience and ease to various program operations, it is best to assess whether the setting where 
this technology is to be applied has suitable infrastructure. Moreover, while technology that makes 
records and entitlements more transparent is welcomed, technology with glitches that can void the 
entitlements of individual beneficiaries, can do more harm than help. This can be especially 
onerous for communities where many members of the household are daily wage laborers and may 
not be able to appear in person to provide their thumbprint or collect their food grains. 
As the technological intervention was only just commencing at the time of this study, things 
may have streamlined further since our visit. In Madhya Pradesh, while FPS are technically run 
by agricultural cooperative societies, these are rarely embedded within a local community, posing 
significant inconvenience to local communities who are able to purchase grains on only two or 
three days of the month. Perhaps more locally based groups could be given control of FPS to serve 
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the needs of their community members. Additionally, Madhya Pradesh’s practice of paying fixed 
monthly salaries seemed to have positive outcomes as the FPS dealer’s fate was not tied to the 
amount of grains sold, something that would be beneficial to consider in the operations of women’s 
SHGs in Jharkhand. 
However, the single largest recommendation for the success of these reforms has to be the 
installing of a functional grievance redressal mechanism that is representative of the community 
and free of officials with vested interests. This must be supported through greater awareness drives 
and grievance camps, as seen in New Delhi, to gather grievances as a collective and bring greater 
spotlight to the lapses in implementation of this program on a large scale. Other public avenues 
for engendering this awareness and accountability are through public hearings, which have also 
been conducted in several parts of the country. 
The NFSA was a testament to several realities experienced in the Indian setting. It signaled 
that despite improvements in availability of food through increased agricultural production, as well 
as rapid economic gains through various pro-market policies, food security is still not a guaranteed 
outcome. It also demonstrates the power of civil society mobilization around socioeconomic rights 
and the impact of political will and governance reforms to provide basic welfare. However as noted 
at the outset, the strategies that have got India to this juncture will require a new direction to 
translate the rights stipulated on paper into functioning and accountable institutions. 
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7. INTEGRATED CHILD DEVELOPMENT SERVICES (ICDS) 
 
7.1 NFSA and the ICDS 
A second core program under the NFSA is the ICDS, which identifies a number of nutrition 
entitlements to be delivered through the local anganwadi center (AWC). Pregnant women and 
lactating mothers are entitled to: 1) a meal, free of charge during pregnancy and six months after 
childbirth through the local AWC; and 2) financial maternity benefits of no less than rupees six 
thousand. For children up to the age of fourteen years, the Act stipulates that: 1) those between six 
months and six years of age will be given an age appropriate meal free through the local AWC that 
meets prescribed nutritional standards; and 2) for children up to eight grade or children between 
ages six and fourteen years, one free mid-day meal will be provided every day except on school 
holidays (Government of India, 2013b). There are also provisions for cooking meals, drinking 
water and sanitation in both schools and AWCs; children who suffer from malnutrition are also to 
be identified and provided free meals. However, unlike with the TPDS, the Act does not specify 
reforms or a separate grievance redressal mechanism for the ICDS. 
 While the NFSA grants these entitlements legal status, the ICDS has suffered from various 
governance challenges over the decades. Considering the ICDS is a complex program that has 
actors across different strata of government, private sector, civil society and community, few 
studies dissect the intricacies of procuring and distributing nutrition-related services and goods. 
Unlike with the TPDS, the NFSA provides no guidelines in implementing the ICDS or addressing 
the institutional gaps that have persisted in its operations. As a result, individual state-level 
experiences can offer insights not only on different approaches to running the ICDS, but also in 
how the passage of the Act has reformed or informed the programs in different regions.  
 
7.2 Results 
7.2.1 Process Net Mapping – Take Home Ration (THR) 
Across the four districts of the two states, a total of 14 process net-mapping exercises were 
conducted with AWWs, along with key informant interviews of senior administrative officials in 
charge of the ICDS program. FGDs were held with mother beneficiaries of the AWC run by the 
interviewed AWWs, allowing for comparisons between accounts of the frontline workers and the 
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actual recipients of their services. The results of the process net-maps are presented below with a 
break-down of the steps involved in their monthly operations pertaining to nutrition. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Process net-map for procurement and distribution of take-home ration packets 
 
For those who do not come to the AWC on a daily basis to have a morning snack and afternoon 
lunch that meet government set standards of nutritional quality and quantity, nutritional assistance 
is provided through pre-packaged take-home ration (THR). These packets target pregnant women 
and lactating mothers, children aged 6 months to 3 years, and adolescent girls. In both states there 
was significant difference in the contents of the THR and the means of its procurement and 
distribution. Figure 7.1 identifies the individual steps involved in the movement of THR packets 
to the end users. This diagram also identifies the flows of payment (both official and unofficial), 
THR (both official and unofficial) and administrative processes.  
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For Jharkhand’s ICDS, over the 8 process net-mapping exercises, the AWWs noted that 
the process of getting the THR to the AWC starts by presenting the relevant registers to the Lady 
Supervisor (LS) indicating who collected the THR in the previous month (Step 1). Upon review, 
the LS then directs a clerk who either himself or appoints another aid at the storage facility to 
release the respective number of THR packets (Step 2) and counts off the quantity as the AWW 
waits at the storage facility or office (Step 3). The AWW then has the packets loaded on the 
transport that she has arranged, usually an autorickshaw or tempo van, which transports the THR 
packets to the AWC (Step 4) and the AWW pays for the transportation from her personal funds 
(Step 5), costing upward of Rs. 100 (~ EUR 1.20) with some transporters charging per sack. Once 
at the AWC, the distribution of these packets takes place, typically on the Village Health and 
Nutrition (VHN) day held in the first week of each month. This distribution is done in the presence 
of frontline health workers (i.e. ASHA, ANM) and often confers the responsibility upon the Mata 
Samithi, or the Mother’s Committee, with distribution (Step 6). The AWW noted this is 
intentionally done so that mothers do not accuse the AWW of cutting back on their THR or issuing 
other complaints.  Once distributed to the mother and child, in the FGDs beneficiaries reported 
distributing the THR food with members of the family (Step 7). As a result, the THR intended to 
last four weeks or one month only lasts as few as five to seven days. Other FGD participants shared 
that for those who did not enjoy the pre-mix packets, the THR would be given to livestock instead 
(Step 8), with a few respondents claiming that the AWW was selling bundles of THR at the village 
market as livestock feed (Step 9). At the end of the month, the AWW must submit her registers to 
LS bearing the signatures of beneficiaries after collecting their THR (Step 10), however this often 
also involves providing some bribe to push through their paperwork and bills for reimbursement. 
Most AWWs reported that they believed this bribe moves its way up the chain of command to the 
CDPO (Step 11) and even the DPO (Step 12). 
 Similar to Jharkhand, AWWs in Madhya Pradesh also reported submitting reports at the 
end of the month with the registry of THR collection/distribution to the LS (Step A), who submits 
this information to the CDPO (Step B). After that, there is door-step delivery of the THR to the 
AWC (Step C). In cases where access to an AWC by road is difficult or otherwise remote, the 
AWC’s THR is clubbed with the nearest AWC, where the THR will be delivered (Step D). In such 
instances, the AWW has to arrange for transportation from the AWC, such as an autorickshaw or 
bullock cart, often with personal funds (Step E). In contrast to Jharkhand’s distribution pattern, in 
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Madhya Pradesh the THR is distributed to beneficiaries on a weekly basis (Step F), with exceptions 
made if the mother is a laborer and would not be able to come to the AWC on a weekly basis. In 
addition to young children and mothers, in Madhya Pradesh there was a separate allocation of THR 
for adolescent girls which did not come up with any of the AWWs interviewed or FGDs conducted 
in Jharkhand, though iron supplementation to adolescents was provided in some cases. While most 
AWWs admitted some payment being made to the CDPO or DPO during the recruitment process, 
most were not comfortable discussing the issue of bribes. However in meetings with physicians 
from the Rashtriya Bal Swasthya Karyakram (RBSK) programs who conduct daily visits to 
different rural AWCs to monitor children’s health, they reported bribes are expected to be paid to 
the LS (Step H), CDPO (Step I) and even the DPO (Step J) who exert significant pressure on their 
subordinate administrators to extract timely payments. 
 
7.2.2 Process Net Mapping of AWC Meals 
The second component of the nutritional services through the ICDS is freshly prepared daily meals 
at the AWC. Figure 7.2 maps the individual steps and actors involved in the procurement of the 
supplies and distribution of the prepared meals, as well as the administrative interactions involved. 
Furthermore, the diagram notes flows of payments and food/grain supplies, both official and 
unofficial. 
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Figure 7.2: Process net-map for the provision of prepared meals at the AWC 
 
In Jharkhand, the daily meals from the AWC are prepared in the AWC itself and previously saw 
the payment of approximately INR 10,000 (~ EUR117) per month to the AWW. This sum was 
used to purchase basic food supplies and grains that would later be disbursed as THR as well as 
be used to prepare daily meals. As of 2015, rice supplies for the AWC meals come from the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI; this agency also supplies/stores grains for the TPDS) as it is much more 
cost-efficient, according to district officials. As with the THR, the first step of procuring the 
supplies for the AWW comes through the submission of registers and receipts of basic food 
supplies to the LS at the monthly meeting (Step 1). As shown in Step 3, AWWs have to go to their 
respective FPS dealer to collect rice, often three months’ worth in one visit. Here however, many 
reported delays and difficulties due to the unresponsiveness of the FPS dealers, forcing them to 
have to use their personal supply of rice to manage the day-to-day nutritional program. Many of 
the AWWs interviewed reported that they stored the supplies in their homes, which often were 
also where the AWCs were operated as no separate building was provided by the government for 
the AWC. In cases where the FPS dealer does not provide the grains, the AWW reported having 
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to lodge a complaint with the LS who then instructs or requests the local go-down to release grains 
to the AWW directly (Step 4) upon presenting a slip. The AWW then arranges the transport of the 
grains from the go-down to the AWC. Additional supplies like lentils, spices, salts and oil are 
purchased separately, but each item has a set budget issued from the CDPO office. As per the 
norms set, the AWC is supposed to provide a morning snack and then a lunch; the daily nutritional 
norms provided are that the child should be given 500 calories of energy and 12-15 grams of 
protein per day across these two meals (Government of India, 2013a). 
 Most AWWs reported that some form of bribe had to be given to supervising officers, 
whether the LS or the CDPO, during AWC check-ups or at the monthly meetings to make sure 
their expense claims were put through, or in the case of some lapse on the part of the AWW’s 
performance, to avoid being reported. In addition, most AWWs reported having to provide some 
financial compensation/incentive to the accompanying member of the Mother’s Samiti 
(Committee) when having to withdraw funds from their joint account. Some AWW felt this was 
necessary as the accompanying mother was losing a day’s wages to come along. During visits to 
various villages, we often saw children carrying the meals home from the AWC where it is likely 
that the food is once again redistributed.  
In Madhya Pradesh, there is a different model in the provision of the meals of the AWC as 
well as the type of THR provided. Since 2009, the Sanjha Chula (or “Common Kitchen”)  program 
has been operationalized which saw the rollout of a decentralized system of meal preparation 
through AWCs (Centre for Advance Research & Development (CARD) & Sambodhi Research 
and Communications, 2010). Instead of the AWW, this responsibility was delegated to women 
self-help groups (SHGs) already tied to other government programs, notably the Mid-Day Meal 
programs in government schools. 
As the Madhya Pradesh process net-map reflects, with the absence of the nutrition and 
cooking responsibilities, the AWW has more time to focus on responsibilities pertaining to 
education, health services, and following up on community members through home visits. The 
AWCs here are open from 9 AM to 4 PM, far longer than in Jharkhand, to provide children a safe 
space while parents or caretakers are occupied with domestic or wage work. The activities are 
instead outsourced to the SHG, which as the map clearly indicates, now experiences the various 
problems that the AWWs faced in Jharkhand. The process commences with the SHG being issued 
a slip to collect grain supplies from an FPS (Step A) which they then take to the store (Step B) to 
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collect the supplies (Step C). However, in some cases store owners can be difficult and claim not 
receiving the stocks for the SHG, which may require some financial offering from the SHG to the 
dealer or the SHG must buy supplies from their own pocket (Step D). Food is often prepared in 
school kitchens along with the mid-day meals and transported to the respective AWC twice (Step 
E) where the AWW signs the SHG register and vice versa (Step F) to certify the delivery of food 
as per the guidelines. This is then distributed to the children as a morning snack and lunch (Step 
G). At the end of the month, it is the SHG that must file their expenses and claims with the CDPO 
office and may also be summoned by the DPO (Step H). Several of the SHGs interviewed 
expressed great delays in release of their reimbursement, with some SHGs having to abandon 
AWC operations altogether. Many felt the delays in repayment may be due to the expectation of 
some bribes from administrators (Step I). When the funds are finally released to the SHG, it is with 
the cost of the ration grains deducted (Step J). In all this, the AWW’s role is to ensure the quality 
of the food delivered, for which she requires a monthly signature from the head of the village (Step 
K) to be able to receive her own salary. Of the three SHGs interviewed, two had to cease their 
operations for preparing AWC meals while one noted an ongoing nine month lapse in payments, 
indicating that these operations still face significant challenges. 
 
Alternate Entry Points for Bribery 
In addition to the listed entry points for bribes in the nutrition services of the ICDS, in both states 
other avenues for bribery were mentioned. In Jharkhand, one such point of entry was in 
maintenance and management aspects of the AWC. For example, the pathetic state of AWCs 
across India has been well documented. For AWCs requiring substantive maintenance or repair 
the CDPO or DPO will approve an amount of financial support, but the actual funds transferred 
will be less than the initial amount. This leaves the AWW responsible for gathering funds to bridge 
the deficit while the administrator pockets the difference. 
 In Madhya Pradesh, there is a weekly celebration among the women beneficiaries of the 
AWC called “Mangal Divas”, literally meaning “auspicious day.” This is intended to build 
community and celebrate various events, including recent births, pregnancies and other 
instructional events for adolescents. The objective is to improve participation at the AWC while 
disseminating essential information on maternal health and nutrition. Funds for these activities are 
issued to the AWW and the Mother’s Committee, which must be withdrawn with a member of the 
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Committee present. Some AWWs mentioned that as the LS know they receive these funds, there 
is an expectation of getting a share from this funding in order to allow the AWWs to work 
unimpeded. 
 In both states what was most notable was that AWWs seemed to accept that even if a bribe 
had to be paid, it was due to some failure on their part. One AWW justified the practice, saying: 
“If you don’t do the work properly, of course you have to suffer the consequences.” When pushed 
further, many AWWs expressed that the expectations versus the support in managing these 
programs were discordant, setting them up to fail. Some explained paying a bribe “out of 
happiness” or a token gesture of thanks. However some AWWs firmly rebuffed this sentiment, 
saying “No one gives money out of any happiness/pleasure.” These additional costs incurred in 
managing the ICDS invariably impact the performance of the nutrition services and resources 
available for the beneficiaries. 
 
7.2.3 Beneficiary Response 
Beneficiaries were convened to assess their satisfaction with the services provided through the 
AWC, with particular focus on the take-home ration (THR) and the daily meals. To facilitate the 
FGDs, in addition to collecting general information on the background of the participants, their 
households and access to other nutrition programs (e.g. TPDS), a matrix ranking exercise was 
conducted to identify which of the ICDS services were deemed the most important for the 
individual or their child. 
 
Take-Home Ration (THR) 
The actual consumption of the THR varied between the two states. As of 2015, the THR in 
Jharkhand consists of a powdered mix of soya, sugar, powdered lentil/chickpea, fortified wheat 
and in some cases powdered milk. In all the FGDs, respondents agreed that when the THR was 
initially rolled out, many experienced stomach trouble and diarrhea as the staple food for these 
communities is rice and many did not understand how this THR was to be prepared. Some 
described just mixing the powder with water and consuming it themselves or giving it to their 
child, despite instructions on the pack. For some this experience was enough to not use the THR 
for personal or household consumption, rather it was given to livestock as feed.  
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In the better performing district of Jharkhand, JH1, respondents claimed that the AWW 
was selling packs of THR to farmers for their livestock. Other respondents advised that while it 
took some time to adjust to the new THR, they and their children now enjoyed it as they had 
learned how to prepare it. In addition to personal preference, some respondents also reported that 
the THR mixture clots and clumps likely due to the sugar and milk powders in some of the pack 
formulae, making it less palatable. A few even mentioned that they found bugs in the packs, which 
may stem from poor storage of the packets, both at the beneficiary home as well as the AWC or 
block/district storage facility. 
 In Madhya Pradesh, the THR included both soya-based halwa, akin to milled wheat, and a 
more traditional meal of khichdi, a mix of rice and lentils. Therefore, most of the respondents did 
not indicate any difficulty or challenges in the consumption or preparation of the THR as they 
were similar to local dishes. However, a minority of FGD participants indicated that they too would 
use the THR for alternate purposes, such as using it to make papad, which is a fried wafer-like 
snack, and some also indicated they gave it to their livestock if they found the THR to be stale or 
old. This seemed less to do with taste preference, however. 
In both states, all respondents indicated that the THR, whether intended for the child or the 
mother, would be distributed with the family, which dilutes the nutritional benefits for the 
beneficiary. Furthermore, the vast majority of women when asked about the nutritional benefits of 
the THR seemed unaware of its actual qualitative impact or benefit in their larger nutrition or 
dietary framework. 
 
AWC Meals 
In both states, beneficiaries seemed satisfied if any meal at all was provided at the AWC. In 
Jharkhand, most respondents indicated that breakfast snacks were rare but lunch was usually 
provided. During the field visits, alarmed Anganwadi Helpers (AWH) could be seen opening up 
THR packets to quickly prepare a morning snack fearing we had come for an inspection. Also 
during some village visits, children could be seen coming home with containers filled with a rice-
based meal, rather than sitting and having it at the AWC itself. This does raise questions as to who 
all ultimately consume the meals once home. 
 In Madhya Pradesh, there was more planning when it came to the daily meals, which were 
publicly put up on menu boards at the AWC. As these meals are prepared by SHGs, there seemed 
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to be greater regularity in the availability and quality of the meals. This type of menu meals were 
on display only in “Model” AWCs in Jharkhand, which will be discussed in the coming section. 
 
Matrix Ranking of ICDS Services 
To further facilitate the dialogue, a matrix ranking was conducted with beneficiaries on the six key 
services of the AWC. Figure 7.3 shows the general distribution of preference among respondents 
of the services, with education and health being the most valued services. As many of the 
communities visited are located remotely from the nearest government facility, the AWC is their 
main resource, especially for antenatal monitoring and early childcare services such as 
immunization. In fact, with the exception of two beneficiaries in Jharkhand (none in Madhya 
Pradesh), no one seemed to express any reliance on the nutrition services from the ICDS. 
Explanations provided for this included that 1) the quality of the food was not so high and 2) as 
the THR did not last very long, it did not in any way change cooking needs or volume of the 
household (i.e. the same amount of food would still be made at home; THR was not a meal 
replacement). 
 
Figure 7.3: Distribution of preference among respondents of ICDS services 
 
 
NFSA 
In the FGDs, participants were also asked about the NFSA and whether they understood that the 
THR and supplementary nutrition were a part and parcel of their entitlements under the Act. No 
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subsidized grains through the TPDS. While a grievance redressal system was nonfunctional in 
both states at the time, in Madhya Pradesh, participants did mention that village level officials, 
such as the Gram Panchayat Secretary or Sarpanch (“head”) were individuals that could be 
approached with problems or who were charged with monitoring the activities of the ICDS. 
 
7.2.4 Model AWCs 
In both states, we also visited and interviewed AWWs of “Model AWCs” which have been coming 
up throughout the country, often built under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). These AWCs are visibly clean, colorful, newer structures with a 
separate building. They also showcase investment in new toys, books and learning materials for 
children. In Jharkhand, this included diverse weekly menus which are the norm in Madhya 
Pradesh. However in the interviews with AWWs, when asked what is the objective of the Model 
AWC, they were unsure. Is it to incentivize other AWWs to improve operations? Or is it to show 
how services can be improved through better infrastructure and investment in the AWC? It 
remained unclear how actual operations would change with the advent of the Model AWC. 
Nonetheless, given the dilapidated structures in which many rural children are expected to sit in, 
the initiative is a welcome one and may encourage greater attendance and participation. 
 
7.3 Discussion 
The NFSA provides no concrete reforms for the ICDS, with the exception of a grievance redressal 
system and a maternity benefits scheme. Consequently, states have not automatically been 
instructed to implement supply or demand side reforms to address governance challenges in the 
running of the ICDS. This study attempted to understand how the implementation of the ICDS has 
changed, if at all, in the aftermath of the NFSA, and how states with greater improvement in child 
stunting levels can offer insights to other states in their implementation of the program. With regard 
to the monetary benefits to expectant mothers, neither state studied had an operational maternity 
entitlement scheme, and this has been an ongoing problem throughout the country. 
Taking Madhya Pradesh as a positive deviant in its progress in reducing levels of child 
stunting, this study attempted to glean lessons from the state’s experience with the ICDS to 
understand different initiatives and approaches that could improve overall performance in the 
nutrition services of the ICDS in other states, specifically Jharkhand. 
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 A supply-side difference between the two states with regard to THR was that there was a 
greater consistency in both the distribution as well as the suitability of the THR to the tastes of 
local communities in Madhya Pradesh than in Jharkhand. What commenced as a common refrain 
among Jharkhand’s AWWs of comparing the nutrition supplement to livestock feed, in many 
instances turned out to be a reality. This is partly because of poor implementation in instructing 
beneficiaries of the correct way to prepare the food, a key programmatic failure that resulted in 
various health and stomach problems. The other reason is that for many in the communities visited, 
rice is their staple and dietary preference and tastes differ from what is being provided. This 
corroborates other studies that note the crucial role of local demands and tastes in implementation 
of nutrition programs, including diversion of these foods to livestock in other Indian states 
(Drewnowski, 1997; E. et al., 2017; Saxena & Srivastava, 2009; World Food Programme, 2016). 
In Madhya Pradesh, on the other hand, the THR distributed conforms more to local diets, so no 
one indicated any preference for the previous system of rice or lentil rations being distributed. 
However in both states, though to a lesser extent in Madhya Pradesh, we find there are leakages 
that persist if the THR is not found to be of good quality and may instead be given to livestock. 
Alternatively, in the case of Jharkhand, we find there may be scope for larger scale diversion of 
these THR packets on the market as livestock feed, a new leakage affliction of which the ICDS 
has a long history (Malik et al., 2015; Swain & Kumaran, 2012).  
 The larger problem that remains with THR is that across both states, the intended 
beneficiary is rarely the one consuming the entirety of the provisions. The issue of intra-household 
allocation of food has been a persistent challenge in nutrition programming, policy and research 
(Cavatorta et al. 2015;  ). In Madhya Pradesh the AWCs abide by a system of handing out one 
packet per week, which ensures that some level of nutrition runs through the month for the mother 
and child. Invariably in both states, food distribution at the household level remains difficult to 
control for or monitor. Though most officials in Jharkhand described the change in the THR as 
being the result of cost-cutting measures rather than a concrete strategy, in traditional economics 
literature the provision of an “inferior good” can be seen as one way to guarantee that a certain 
good reaches the intended population (Mehta & Jha, 2014). In this case, providing THR that is not 
consistent with local diets could have been a way to plug two types of diversions: 1) black market 
sale of grains and lentils procured for THR distribution; and 2) diversion of THR to other 
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household members. However, neither of these seem applicable to the experiences of the 
beneficiaries interviewed. 
 This comparative case study also provided two different models of daily meal provisioning 
through the ICDS. In Jharkhand, the AWCs are still abiding by the traditional system of purchasing 
grains and basic ingredients themselves to prepare a snack and lunch daily for children. These 
costs must then be reimbursed through the CDPO office. In Madhya Pradesh on the other hand, 
these services have entirely been outsourced to women’s SHGs, relieving the burden of the 
accounts and the actual preparation of these meals from the AWW so that she may focus on other 
essential activities, such as education, home check-ups and other assigned responsibilities. A well-
documented supply-side challenge of the ICDS has been the workload of AWWs as a significant 
burden in completing various monitoring and reporting activities of communities on a regular basis 
(Adhikari & Bredenkamp, 2009; Gupta, 2001; Parasar & Bhavani, 2018). However, the responses 
of the beneficiaries were underwhelming as to the improvement in other services. In both states, 
beneficiaries pointed to the immunization services as the most valued service of the ICDS, with 
health services coming a close second followed by education. This shunning of the importance of 
nutrition may in part be due to various social factors, including shame or embarrassment to 
admitting in front of a group reliance on such THR or AWC meals (Maitra 2017). With the 
exception of one AWW who operated an AWC closer to the urban center, several AWWs 
described inadequate training when it comes to educating children, or even for the materials and 
toys that were sent to the AWC. Even without having to make meals, AWWs in Madhya Pradesh 
seemed to have to juggle new responsibilities as part of various other district and state-level 
schemes or programs, for example patrolling village residents for the Open Defecation Free (ODF) 
campaigns and enrollment of residents for Aadhaar and Voter IDs. 
 However, has the involvement of SHGs affected the delivery of meals through the ICDS? 
There has been much credit showered on streamlining of the mid-day meal (MDM) program with 
the meals for the AWC as part of the Common Kitchen program (Bose et al., 2014; George et al., 
2017), which may explain the general satisfaction among FGD participants in Madhya Pradesh 
even though some felt the quality of the meals could be better. 
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7.4 Recommendations 
One lesson that Jharkhand and other states can learn from Madhya Pradesh is the importance of 
matching local dietary needs and preferences when administering nutrition supplementation. The 
absence of this portends governance challenges of possible corruption or elite capture as to whose 
interests are being served when less suitable supplementation is being forced on an unwilling 
public. Madhya Pradesh also offers valuable lessons in terms of the benefits of longer operation 
hours, and the outsourcing of supplementary meals to women’s SHGs allowing AWW to focus on 
other key aspects of the ICDS program which can be replicated in other parts of the country. 
 However, both states still seem to be suffering from age-old governance challenges, which 
were only addressed by the grievance redressal component of the NFSA. As the grievance 
redressal mechanism did not seem to be operational in either state or known to beneficiaries and 
AWW alike, this intended demand-side reform holds no water. In both states, administrators are 
still able to exert pressure on AWWs and even SHGs in the case of Madhya Pradesh, by stalling 
payments, threatening disciplinary action, and overburdening these workers with the 
responsibilities of various other public programs and schemes. Recently national and state 
government officials did raise the wages of AWW and AWH (PIB, 2018; The Pioneer, 2018). This 
is a welcome step to strengthen incentives for these workers, however it is unclear whether this 
will only feed the coffers of a long chain of public officials. 
 From the supply-side, Madhya Pradesh’s initiative to delegate nutrition activities can be 
seen as strengthening the capacity of ICDS workers and creating a check and balance system 
between the AWW and the SHG. However, as our FGDs revealed, while regularity of meals exists, 
it is unclear what nutritional standards these meals meet, if any. Furthermore, when SHGs fail to 
receive their remuneration for their work, many are forced out of these activities, which then shifts 
the burden back to the AWW. From the demand-side, the grievance mechanism is essential for the 
future of the NFSA and guaranteeing legal entitlement to nutrition benefits. However above and 
beyond the law’s existence, campaigns have to be made to spread awareness to the public on their 
rights and their relation to the state and service providers. Without a credible threat of being held 
accountable, AWWs remain at the bottom of a long food chain for corrupt practices, by pilfering 
budgets and supplies intended for the public. 
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8. NUTRITION REHABILITATION CENTERS (NRCS) 
 
8.1 Between the NFSA and NRCs 
The NFSA focuses predominantly on two national programs, and the entitlements under the Act 
focus almost exclusively on providing food subsidies and food supplementation. While access and 
availability of nutrition are essential aspects to a right to food, as this study’s conceptual framework 
shows, there is a large swathe of factors that are essential for ensuring optimal nutrition outcomes. 
While not a legally binding element in the Act, Schedule III of the NFSA lists “Provisions for 
Advancing Food Security” which are to be “progressively realized.” These include a revitalization 
of agriculture through agrarian reforms and increased investments; ensuring livelihood security, 
especially farmers, through input and monetary support mechanisms; incentivizing decentralized 
procurement of coarse grains to diversify the food basket; access to clean water, sanitation, health 
care, nutrition, health and education, especially for adolescent girls; and pensions for senior 
citizens, single women and those with disability (Government of India, 2013). 
 By prioritizing food-based programs that have a long record of governance challenges and 
not adequately addressing equally important factors in ensuring food and nutrition security as per 
the Act’s life-cycle approach, this study sought to better understand the diverse pathways to 
undernutrition. The success of any public program must consider the perspective, needs and 
experiences of the intended beneficiaries to ensure effective implementation. To explore the 
individual narratives and public understanding of the diagnosis of poor nutrition, visits were made 
to nutrition rehabilitation centers (NRCs), known as malnutrition treatment centers (MTCs) in the 
state of Jharkhand, to examine the rehabilitation of children diagnosed with severe acute 
malnutrition (SAM) and the experience of their guardians. In addition, the NRCs themselves were 
studied to assess the governance challenges faced by service providers and the dynamic between 
NRC staff, and patients and their mothers in the rehabilitation process. The focus of this study was 
to look at both the institutional challenges faced by service providers in these facilities, as well as 
delve into the lives of the mothers and children admitted which can explain what other factors may 
be contributing to poor nutrition and its understanding. 
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8.2 Participant and NRC Selection 
Consistent with the previous two studies, the same states and districts were used in this work and 
a minimum of two NRCs were visited in each district. An additional NRC was only selected if 
there were no admitted patients at the visited NRC. In JH1 and JH2, all 6 MTCs across both 
districts were visited. In Madhya Pradesh, two NRCs were visited in each district, one in the district 
headquarters as this is the largest NRC with 20 beds, and one additional NRC was visited in a 
neighboring block. In Jharkhand, these visits were conducted between September and October 
2016, while in Madhya Pradesh these visits were conducted from November to January 2017. 
 During each NRC visit, all admitted mothers who were available and willing were 
interviewed at the facility itself. All effort was made to distance the interview subject from the 
NRC supervisor to put them at ease. Records were also collected from the NRC nursing staff of 
patients who had been discharged six months prior to the visit to conduct follow-up visits. Six 
months was used as an adequate time frame to assess how the time spent in the NRC/MTC had 
impacted the mother and the care of the child since leaving the NRC. Mothers/patients were not 
randomly selected, but households were visited in the chronological order that they were admitted 
six months prior. 
 A minimum of two days was spent at each NRC with patients, conducting participant 
observation between the hours of 9:30 AM till 4 PM to examine the interactions between the staff 
and patients, as well as observe the various activities at the facility. Finally, in-depth interviews 
were conducted with mothers at the NRC/MTC regarding the health history of the child, as well 
as their experience at the facility. In the follow-up visits with discharged children, an effort was 
made to include both parents of the child in the interview so as to see how their understanding or 
care of the child has changed since being leaving the facility, as well as identify what challenges 
remain. 
 
8.3 Findings 
Status of Operations 
MTCs in Jharkhand and NRCs in Madhya Pradesh are organized slightly differently for treating 
SAM cases. In Jharkhand, typically there is a Medical Officer in charge (MOIC) for an MTC, who 
oversees a team of auxiliary nurse midwives (ANM) or staff nurses, along with one support staff 
to clean the premises on a regular basis. In Madhya Pradesh, there is a larger team with more 
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defined roles. One MOIC is charged with visiting all the block-level NRCs in a district. There is 
an NRC-in-charge responsible for managing a specific NRC, who oversees a team of nurses, one 
feeding demonstrator (FD), caretakers (CT) and cleaning staff. Table 8.1 shows a breakdown of 
the existing staff and shortages of staff at each of the visited sites between September and January 
2017. It should be noted that though six MTCs were visited in Jharkhand, at one facility we found 
neither patients nor staff during the visit. 
 
 
Across both states and all four districts, we found no facility staffed with all the requisite personnel 
as per the guidelines for the facility. Notably, all facilities had vacancies in medical staff, including 
in two cases no medical officers specifically assigned in charge of the NRC/MTC. Every center 
was missing nurses who are critical for ensuring the day-to-day treatment and recovery of SAM 
children. In Jharkhand, we also see that as there are fewer staff members, nurses must multi-task 
across administering medical interventions, preparing the diets and nutritional supplement for the 
children and overseeing other administrative responsibilities, such as data entry, billing and 
ordering supplies. The absence of cooks and sweepers in several facilities is also critical, as SAM 
children are particularly sensitive to poor hygiene and sanitation given many suffer from weak 
immunity. Regular feeding at two-hour intervals is essential and made difficult when there is no 
Table 8.1: Staff overview in Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand, 2016-2017 
  Shortage of Staff Current staff 
 State   
Medical 
Staff 
Support 
Staff Medical Staff Support Staff 
Jharkhand 
  
  
JH1 4 ANM Cook 2 ANM, MOIC Sweeper 
JH1 1 ANM Cook 3 ANM, 1 MOIC   
JH2 1 ANM Cook 1 MOIC, 2 ANM Sweeper 
JH2 
1 ANM, 
Nutrition 
Counsellor 
- 
3 ANM, 1 MOIC 
Nutrition Counsellor, Cook, 
Sweeper 
JH2 
5 ANM, 
MOIC 
- 
3 ANM, 1 MOIC 
- 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
  
  
  
MP1 
MOIC, 2 
Nurses 
- 
1 Nurse, Pediatrician 1 FD, 3 CT, 1 Cook 
MP1 1 Nurse   
1 Nurse, NRC-in-
Charge 
1 FD, 2 CT, 1 Cook, 1 
Sweeper 
MP2 1 Nurse Sweeper 
1 NRC-in-Charge, 1 
MOIC, 1 Nurse 1 FD, 2 cooks, 3 CTs 
MP2 1 Nurse 1 cook 
1 NRC-in-charge, 1 
Nurse 1 FD, 2 CT 
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committed member of the staff present to ensure the preparation of hygienic, nutritious and child-
appropriate food throughout the course of the day. 
Participant observation further corroborated that ANMs in Jharkhand are entirely running 
the operations of the MTC. At no MTC did we observe more than one ANM at a given time, which 
means these responsibilities fall entirely on the shoulders of a single individual, with some 
exceptions where there was staff to clean the hospital ward. In Madhya Pradesh on the other hand, 
the delegation of duties was clearer but not completely separate. Often Feeding Demonstrators 
(FD) would be seen aiding with record keeping or data entry, as opposed to exclusively focusing 
on the preparation of diet plans or providing counselling to the mothers. 
Counselling, either in a group setting or on an individual basis, was never observed in any 
of the MTCs or NRCs visited. In an MTC in Jharkhand, a child could be heard crying continuously 
for over 30 minutes yet the ANM did not go to the patient ward to check the situation or see what 
might be the problem. The closest that a staff member came to counselling would be on their way 
in or out of the ward, to casually remark or suggest something to the mother on her handling of the 
child. One FD in Madhya Pradesh agreed saying, “Counselling is the biggest challenge due to the 
volume of work and shortage of staff. Counselling is seen as everyone’s responsibility at any 
available time in the day.” Another nurse in Jharkhand described the patients as being difficult to 
counsel: “They don’t listen. Especially on issues of hygiene, they are not attentive and as a result 
the child keeps falling ill. It’s unclear how much they will follow when they return home.” During 
village visits to AWCs, a doctor working with the Rashtriya Bal Swasthya Karyakram (“National 
Child Welfare Program”) declared, “NRCs are a complete waste. They don’t change anything on 
the ground --- there is no counseling, and no reliable referral system at the village-level.” 
Madhya Pradesh has the longest experience in India with NRCs for nearly two decades, 
which may explain the streamlined organization structure at each NRC, both at the district and 
block levels. However in Jharkhand, each MTC seemed to operate differently from the other 
depending on the setting and in great part due to the shortage of staff. One of the MTCs visited 
appeared closed when we arrived, but soon the ANM arrived to open the facility and slowly one 
or two patients trickled in over the course of the morning. The ANM explained that though there 
is a need for SAM facilities in this area, mothers in the local community are not willing to stay at 
the MTC overnight as their main livelihood source is making bidis, or local cigarettes. 
Consequently, this MTC functions from morning till evening with mothers bringing their children 
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for a few hours to be weighed and get some therapeutic feeding each day for the child. Aside from 
the ANM, no other medical or support staff was present on the days visited. While this provides 
some relief in the way of nutrition supplementation, other factors that are equally important to the 
wellbeing of such weak children, like sanitation and hygiene, cannot be controlled for when they 
are day patients at these centers. 
Sanitation and hygiene are important aspects of treating SAM, however, in most of the 
facilities visited, the centers themselves did not reflect sanitary conditions. In Jharkhand, many of 
the MTCs were part of fairly old and dilapidated hospital campuses, often separate from the main 
hospital unit. On the other hand in Madhya Pradesh, many of the NRCs were placed adjacent to 
the pediatric wards, allowing for greater surveillance by medical staff as well as greater 
maintenance of the physical premises. Nonetheless, budget cuts were mentioned in both states as 
a problem, prompting one medical officer in Madhya Pradesh to reveal that the “Sweeper” budget 
had to be cut. Cleanliness was also one of the two main areas in need of improvement that 
respondents across both states indicated. 
 
Household Background 
To understand the beneficiary experience, all willing mothers present at 8 MTC/NRC facilities 
across both states were interviewed. The figure below captures a snapshot of the life of the families 
of SAM children, both admitted and discharged.  
 
Table 8.2: Household background and characteristics  
    Jharkhand 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
    (n=14+11) (n=35+15) 
Cases Admitted 14% 35% 
  Follow-Ups 11% 15% 
Children Female 52% 48% 
  Male 48% 52% 
      
Mother's None 61% 26% 
Education 4th grade 13% 6% 
  8th grade 22% 38% 
  12th grade 4% 28% 
  Higher Education - 2% 
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Children 1 child 24% 28% 
  More than 3 kids 36% 8% 
  2-3 kids 40% 64% 
Mother Age at Marriage <18 88% 76% 
  Institutional Delivery 64% 88% 
  
Mother Works Outside the 
home 71% 54% 
Livelihood Agriculture 60% 22% 
  Migrant Labor 24% 2% 
  Manual Labor 12% 44% 
  Other 4% 32% 
Income I <= INR 3000 68% 58% 
  INR 3000 < I <= INR 5000 24% 30% 
  I > INR 5000 8% 12% 
 
In both states, we interviewed roughly equal number of female and male SAM cases. Among these, 
approximately a quarter of cases in both states were the family’s first and only child, while the 
bulk of respondents had two to three children at home. The vast majority of mothers in both states 
were married before the age of 18, though it should be noted here that these were approximate 
ages as many of the mothers could not recount their exact age. Instead additional information 
regarding schooling or other life events (e.g. menstruation, spacing between children, age at 
marriage) were used to approximate the age.  
Majority of the mothers had institutional deliveries, though in Jharkhand the figures were 
substantially lower. In many of the interviews in Jharkhand, the reasons for not going to the 
hospital for delivery included a general suspicion that deliveries in hospitals entail caesarean 
sections which may prevent mothers from working afterwards; greater comfort to deliver at home; 
and the non-arrival or delay of various frontline health workers.  
Between the two states, we see that in Jharkhand over 60 percent of mothers responded 
having no or negligible education, while this was only true for 26 percent in Madhya Pradesh 
where 68 percent of respondents had above 4th grade education. In Jharkhand 60 percent of the 
respondents earned their livelihood through various agricultural activities, both on and off their 
own land, with a sizeable share migrating for work and the remaining respondents working in 
construction or other forms of manual labor. Respondents in Madhya Pradesh migrated far less 
and most were involved in manual labor, such as construction, loading and as attendants in stores. 
The second largest group worked as store keepers or taxi drivers, followed by agricultural workers. 
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Most notably, in both states nearly 90 percent of the respondents estimated a monthly salary of 
INR 5000 or less (~EUR 61). 
  
Access to Other Entitlements 
The Anganwadi Center (AWC) and Anganwadi Worker (AWW) play a crucial role in the 
identification and treatment of SAM children. As part of the ICDS’ provisions, supplementary 
nutrition is one of the six core services of an AWC as well as a legal entitlement under the National 
Food Security Act (NFSA) 2013. Those eligible for supplementary nutrition include pregnant 
women, lactating mothers, children aged six months to three years, and children aged three to six 
years. For the first three groups, the supplementary nutrition is provided by means of a take home 
ration packet that should grant each individual four packets per month. In Jharkhand, these packets 
are usually given out on the Village Health and Nutrition (VHN) Day once a month, while in 
Madhya Pradesh a packet is given each week. For the fourth group, this supplement nutrition is to 
be given as freshly prepared hot snack and meal on a daily basis at the AWC. 
 
Table 8.3: Beneficiary’s access to NFSA entitlement programs  
TPDS    Jharkhand Madhya Pradesh 
 Receiving grains 58% 77% 
  No ration card 42% 23% 
  Missing members from card 67% 26% 
  Gap in ration 40% 11% 
ICDS     
 Irregular or no Take Home Ration (THR) 35% 14% 
  Irregular or no weighing of child 38% 30% 
  THR < 4pkts 45% 19% 
 
In Jharkhand, over one-third of respondents reported receiving either no packets or receiving these 
packets irregularly. In addition, among those who did receive the packets regularly, 45 percent 
reported that they received less than the four packets to which they are entitled. In Madhya Pradesh 
these figures were better with only 14 percent reporting irregular or no packets distributed and 19 
percent receiving fewer packets than they are entitled to. Almost all respondents confirmed that 
the packets would be distributed across all present family members rather than given only to the 
intended beneficiary (i.e. mother or child), and most respondents did not seem aware of the 
intended nutritional impact of the THR. One mother said, “If you make something at home, how 
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can you not share it with the other family members? Everyone likes it, and eats.” Other 
beneficiaries of the THR included livestock, such as goats and cows, and sometimes the grains 
were creatively recycled to make papad, a savory fried/baked snack item eaten with meals. AWCs 
also play a critical role in monitoring the development of young children and in both states regular 
weighing of children is still an issue, with 38 percent and 30 percent in Jharkhand and Madhya 
Pradesh reporting irregularities, respectively. 
Another critical food and nutrition program is the Targeted Public Distribution System 
(TPDS), which provides subsidized grains of wheat and/or rice to households. Grains distributed 
through the TPDS are also a legal entitlement, with every member of an eligible Priority household 
entitled to five kilograms of grain, and households deemed the poorest of the poor entitled to 35 
kilograms of grains. Among the guardians interviewed, 58 percent and 77 percent of eligible 
families in Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh, respectively, reported receiving ration. In Jharkhand, 
this means that 2 out of 5 households were still not receiving their ration, and this rises to nearly 
two-thirds of ration card holders having missing family members and thus eligible for less than 
full ration entitlements. This figure was much lower in Madhya Pradesh where only 26 percent of 
households had missing household members on their ration card. Gaps in ration were also 
substantially higher among Jharkhand respondents, with 40 percent experiencing gaps in their 
monthly grain allotment. 
 
Experience at the MTC/NRC 
In both Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh the medical staff of nurses and doctors described a very 
similar sequence of steps when admitting a child to the facility. During the study, no instance of 
admission of a child at the MTC or NRC could be observed first-hand, therefore this work relies 
on the advice of the nurses, the doctor, if present, and then triangulate with the mothers present at 
the facility.  
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Table 8.4: Admission to MTC/NRC  
    Jharkhand Madhya Pradesh 
   (n=14+11) (n=35+15) 
Symptoms Other Symptoms 45% 35% 
  Fever, Diarrhea 30% 37% 
  Weight/MUAC 25% 29% 
     
Admission  Immediate 8% 40% 
 Time 1 months or less 23% 26% 
  2 months 38% 12% 
  3 months or more 31% 23% 
 
Mothers were asked what were the main symptoms prior to the child’s admission to the NRC or 
MTC. Across both states, over 70 percent of parents said the symptoms had progressed to 
persistent fevers, diarrhea and further complications, including illnesses such as jaundice, malaria 
and typhoid. In Jharkhand, nearly 70 percent of respondents reported waiting two months or more 
to admit the child after the initial referral to the MTC. Several reasons were provided for this delay. 
Some mothers advised that due to pending agricultural work in the season or absent spouses who 
seasonally migrated for work, they had to delay admission. In some cases, the local AWWs or 
ASHAs would have to find or negotiate time to take the parent, often waiting for other referral 
cases to join so as to maximize a single day’s trip to the respective MTC. Several others attempted 
various traditional medicines and alternatives before seeking admission at the MTC. 
 Table 8.5 shows a breakdown of various aspects of the admission and stay at the NRC or 
MTC. In both states, over two-thirds of referrals to the centers was still coming through AWW. In 
Madhya Pradesh, however, there were more cases of referrals through doctors, both at health 
centers and hospitals, but also through the RBSK program where doctors visit different villages 
daily at using the AWC as a mobile clinic, conduct check-ups of young children. 
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Table 8.5: NRC Referral and services  
    Jharkhand Madhya Pradesh 
   (n=14+11) (n=35+15) 
Referral Doctor 18% 33% 
  AWW/ASHA 65% 67% 
  ANM 6% - 
  Others 12% - 
     
 Services Adequate Food - 70% 
  Mother Tests 16% 78% 
  Child Tests 73% 91% 
  Education 47% 57% 
     
  Doctor Visits 67% 82% 
  New Knowledge 7% 10% 
     
  Readmission to NRC/MTC 0% 32% 
  
Confirm Receipt of 
Compensation 27% 42% 
 
Upon arrival at the MTC or NRC, a slew of tests must be conducted for both mother and children, 
including blood tests for both and often x-rays, in addition to MUAC and weight measurements of 
the child. Here there is a huge difference in the response of mothers in Jharkhand and Madhya 
Pradesh, as 16 percent reported tests being administered for them in the former while 78% 
responded having tests done in the latter. This is both a breach in protocol but also a huge problem 
considering over half the children admitted to these facilities are still at an age where they are 
being breastfed. A mother’s health status would directly bear on the health outcomes of the child. 
However even when tests are conducted, most mothers responded that they received little feedback 
or explanation on the procedures themselves or their outcomes, with the exception when a child 
needed a blood transfusion before commencing the feeding regimen. 
Mothers or guardians are also asked to provide their bank details for transmitting the 
compensation for their stay at the facility upon completion of their stay. In cases where mothers 
do not have accounts, they urge a family member to set one up and in the interim support the 
mothers temporarily through direct cash payment. This was especially important in Jharkhand 
where at the time of this study, mothers were not provided with meals during their stay at the MTC, 
whereas in Madhya Pradesh they were provided at least two meals and snacks every day. 
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Guardians in Jharkhand were expected to either purchase meals from nearby shops or where 
available, get meals from the “Daal Bhaat Yojana” which provides a daily lunch to the public 
consisting of rice and lentils for Rs. 5 (~EUR .06). In our interviews, most mothers reported either 
having family members deliver their food on a daily basis, sometimes across long distances, or 
having to prepare food themselves on the hospital premises. They would bring rice, wood for fuel 
and pots to prepare their meals. In Madhya Pradesh 70 percent of mothers/guardians responded 
that the meals were filling, however those who felt it was not sufficient would supplement with 
food brought from home or their relatives. 
 At the facility itself feeding is a major part of the rehabilitation and recovery of the child, 
however other aspects are equally important, particularly regarding the education of the mother. 
Here however, we see gaps regarding the counseling and education of the mother during the two 
weeks she is at the hospital. Only 47 and 57 percent of the respondents indicated any education or 
counseling during their stay in Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh, respectively. In none of the visits 
at any of the MTCs or NRCs did we observe any kind of educational or counseling session of the 
mothers even though it was mentioned by all NRC and MTC staff as one of their responsibilities, 
and even provided a daily breakdown of topics in Madhya Pradesh. Of those who reported some 
level of knowledge or education dissemination, a very small fraction found this information on 
feeding, sanitation and hygiene to be new. 
 
Post-MTC/NRC 
In the follow-up interviews conducted in Madhya Pradesh we find that nearly one-third of the 
women interviewed had been admitted to the NRC more than once, both prior to our referenced 
admission or since. In Jharkhand, on the other hand, none of the women interviewed indicated that 
they had previously admitted their children to the MTC or had considered readmitting the children 
since their last admission despite many indicating that symptoms had resurfaced, such as diarrhea. 
Some of the follow-up cases in Jharkhand had left the MTC before completion of their time and 
the main reasons for this included feeling lonely and uncomfortable at the MTC. It should be noted 
that these mothers belonged to tribal communities and did not speak Hindi very comfortably. They 
also felt that some of the staff at these facilities, specifically those responsible for cleaning, were 
very harsh with them. In one instance, while waiting to interview the MOIC, we witnessed the 
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verbal abuse of a caretaker or sweeper when a child had soiled a bedsheet. One mother reported, 
“I was afraid to go back for fear of being chastised by the staff for having left.” 
 Despite the prevalence of cases which had been readmitted in Madhya Pradesh, in both 
states there still seems to be a reliance on informal avenues to treat SAM symptoms. In Madhya 
Pradesh, medical staff in one district NRC described a common alternative sought by families are 
fraudulent doctors, colloquially “quack” doctors, who provide conflicting advice or counsel to that 
of the NRCs. All the discharged women from this district NRC who were interviewed were aware 
of the same quack doctor, and one of the follow-up cases had also consulted with him. She showed 
the products he had prescribed for the treatment of her child’s low weight and other SAM 
symptoms. The mother expressed satisfaction with the quack doctor and his prescription, adding 
that she felt the child had gained weight and looked healthier. However, for the medical staff, these 
quick-fix solutions are problematic in the long-run for any child. 
 In both states, the biggest challenges women faced at home was to replicate or maintain 
the conditions at the MTC or NRC. These include an inability to purchase certain ingredients that 
were the staple of the diet in the hospital facility, specifically milk. Many mothers being the main 
caretaker of elderly or ailing family members admitted that they are still not able to give as much 
attention to the children due to their other responsibilities. In the matter of sanitation and hygiene, 
many mothers reported trying to always boil water and keep children clean, however the vast 
majority in both states did not have toilets in their home. 
 Finally, both states offer compensation for the mothers when staying at the MTC and NRC, 
as well as financial incentives to frontline workers (AWW, ASHA, AWC Helper) for bringing 
patients to the facility and ensuring their follow-ups. Mothers in Jharkhand receive INR 100 per 
day for each day of their stay, while mothers in Madhya Pradesh receive INR 120 (~EUR 1.48) 
per day, and INR 100 (~ EUR 1.23) additional for conveyance. This is somewhat less than the 
daily wages set under India’s public works program, which offers a daily wage of INR 172 (~ EUR 
2) as of 2017. Madhya Pradesh also provides additional compensation for the follow-ups of INR 
220 (~EUR 2.71) each and nutritional packets. In Madhya Pradesh, over half the respondents 
confirmed receiving the compensation but this figure was lower in Jharkhand. In majority of the 
responses, the mothers had either not checked on the status of payment, or she did not know if the 
money had come into the account as the husband manages it. In Madhya Pradesh, some 
respondents indicated they received the initial sum of INR 1780 (~EUR 20) but did not receive the 
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money for follow-ups. The financial incentive however did not appear to be a strong motivation 
factor for the mothers, who in most cases would still delay admission to finish work at home or 
wait for family members who can manage the household and the other children. In Madhya 
Pradesh, in multiple NRCs there were also concerns about how effective health and AWW were 
in referring SAM cases, even with financial incentives. Given the workload of an AWW, taking 
an entire day out to admit patients did not appear a top priority from the perspective of the NRC 
and MTC staff, especially since the larger pay-off comes much later with successful completion 
of the follow-up visits by the mother and child. 
 The final provision for discharged patients from an NRC or MTC is that they are supposed 
to receive double their THR entitlements from their local AWC and in none of the cases we 
followed-up did the parent or guardian report receiving double their entitlement of THR, which 
would be eight packets instead of four per month. 
 
8.4 Discussion 
India’s NFSA calls for a life-cycle approach to food and nutrition security, which requires critical 
interventions throughout the course of an individual’s life. While programs like the ICDS and 
TPDS have been the pillars of food security and nutrition for decades, much of recent scholarship 
recognizes that there are various other factors that contribute to overall health and nutritional 
wellbeing. NRCs and MTCs provide a self-selected sample of the population that have, despite 
these various provisions, slipped into nutritional deprivation. Studying such facilities and their 
patients’ experiences can offer valuable insights not just on clinical outcomes and operations of 
such facilities, but also on how these families cope with the diagnosis, its treatment and how they 
rehabilitate a child in the long-run, whether through domestic practices and education or through 
availing of other nutrition entitlements. 
 The conceptual framework for this study lays out how both demand and supply-side factors 
must be a good fit in a given context to yield desired policy or social outcomes. While there are 
no specific guidelines for how NRCs should function or be reformed within the NFSA, many of 
the demand and supply side conditions are still applicable to this program. Moreover, as these 
programs are focused on medically severe cases of wasting and SAM, it can shed light on the 
various “Other Factors” that are also a part of such a framework to achieving optimal nutrition 
outcomes that are otherwise not being addressed within our model. 
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This study has compared NRCs in two states with special focus on the experience of 
mothers and their SAM children before, during and post the NRC. Perhaps most notably, we tried 
to interact more intensively with the caregivers, generally the mothers of SAM children. As 
envisioned by Bengoa (1964), the success of such facilities and programs rests on the engagement 
of the mothers or caregivers of affected children, but who are too often overlooked in such facilities 
in India and in the wider literature on NRCs. 
Interviews with staff and medical personnel at the MTC or NRC revealed staff shortages 
in all facilities and districts and key supply-side obstacles in building capacity for implementing 
such a program. This meant that in Jharkhand where MTC roles are less differentiated, the bulk of 
the management of the MTC fell on the shoulders of a single ANM at any given time. This however 
is not new in the broader academic literature on the public healthcare system in India, where 
shortages of medical staff is an epidemic (Bhaumik, 2013; Sharma, 2015). NRCs and MTCs are 
mere casualties in a larger crisis to incentivize and facilitate the training of more medical 
professionals at every level. However in the case of treating SAM, the one role that is stipulated 
in the operation guidelines but never surfaced in the interviews with staff was that of the Medical 
Social Worker. In the 75 interviews conducted, while there are undoubtedly similarities and 
overlaps in the challenges faced by the child and its family, there is also the need for individual 
attention and customized counseling. Especially in instances where women reported alcoholism, 
mental/physical abuse and mental health problems, no amount of counseling on nutrition can 
mitigate the effects of such conditions on the wellbeing of the mother and her children. Budget 
cuts were also reported by NRC/MTC staff, which invariably meant cuts to funding for Sweepers 
or Care Takers that are essential for ensuring a safe and hygienic environment for the children 
admitted. 
Beyond the staff and funding, local dynamics also pose challenges for the running of MTCs 
and NRCs as envisioned. For example, the unavailability of necessary ingredients for making TF-
100 for the feedings seems like a fundamental problem for which the ANM we interviewed had 
neither a solution nor anyone she could approach. In addition, the inability of mothers to fully 
commit to a 14-day stay at one MTC means that some facilities have had to compromise on 
monitoring other critical aspects of a child’s rehabilitation while providing check-ups and 
nutritional supplementation, which may explain the cynicism some medical practitioners have of 
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these facilities being merely another program for feeding or supplementary nutrition (Dasgupta et 
al., 2014). 
Among the critical demand-side obstacles for the mothers of SAM children are the 
numerous social and cultural determinants that hinder a mother’s ability to both identify and 
demand better conditions for nutritional outcomes. Through the in-depth interviews there were 
certain key traits found across the majority of mothers, most notably the prevalence of child 
marriage and in many cases pregnancy and delivery of their first child before the age of 18. Child 
marriage is a practice that is still far too common in India and as has already been discussed through 
extensive research in public health literature that suggests that risks are greater for malnutrition in 
children born to mothers married as minors (Raj et al., 2010). Add to this the fact that in both states 
mothers were not completing secondary education, with 60 percent of mothers in Jharkhand not 
having any elementary education. In the vast majority of cases in both states, the three main reasons 
for either no schooling or discontinuation of studies were distance to the nearest school, work load 
at home, and pressure for marriage. With regards to education, there are several studies that show 
that child underweight and stunting are significantly higher when the mother has little to no 
education (Deaton & Drèze, 2009; Naandi Foundation, 2011). 
At the household level, the vast majority of the population in both states live on low wages, 
with Jharkhand respondents still heavily reliant on agricultural labor and migrant work to support 
themselves. In Madhya Pradesh, there was a greater range of livelihood sources, with far less 
reliance on migration but agriculture, transport services and small enterprises being income 
generating activities (Keshri & Bhagat, 2012). Majority of the mothers also reported working 
outside the home, mainly in agriculture. Migration is a growing trend as agricultural work becomes 
increasingly difficult to sustain throughout the year. In the quest for income generating activities, 
however, leaving one’s village can often cut an individual off from various social safety nets which 
are tied to a home address.  
At the outset, four key objectives were listed as per government guidelines for the 
management of NRCs. The first two objectives focus on the SAM patients and reduction in 
mortality of these children, and the promotion of physical and psychosocial growth of children 
with SAM. This study did not focus on the medical or clinical technicalities of the treatment and 
its outcomes, rather it focused on the perceptions, understanding and experience of both service 
providers and mothers in the treatment of SAM children. Overwhelmingly, mothers perceived that 
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their children were improving while at the NRC or MTC, though many did not identify major 
differences in the care of the child between home and the facility.  
Madhya Pradesh had an early start with NRCs given the acute state of nutritional 
deprivation the state identified early on, and has moved to shore up state resources to identify and 
treat as many SAM cases as possible through the largest network of NRCs in the country. From 
this study, there are certain common-sense practices that other states, like Jharkhand, could 
immediately implement to improve the experience of patients. The first is food – considering 
severe malnutrition is the problem being treated, it is surprising that day-to-day food provisions 
are not there for the attending parent or children who have to come along when the SAM child is 
admitted. This can not only deter admission, but can impair the health of the mother, who is often 
still breastfeeding at the time of admission. Furthermore, a SAM child may be exposed to various 
germs or bacteria when the mother continues to work outside the NRC to prepare her own meals. 
 Some level of sensitivity has to also be considered among the personnel of the MTCs in 
Jharkhand where many of our respondents hailed from tribal communities with varying linguistic 
and sociocultural backgrounds. Considering the widespread shortages in MTC staff in most 
facilities, these factors may go unaddressed but have substantial consequences in improving the 
experience of mothers while at the MTC, and prevent leaving a facility before the child is 
rehabilitated due to loneliness or in some cases prejudices of MTC staff. Furthermore, better 
understanding of these communities can ensure comprehension on issues relating to a child’s 
health and nutrition. 
 In Madhya Pradesh, even though mothers reported staff as being very friendly or pleasant, 
education and counseling remained a challenge. As our findings show, most mothers did not learn 
anything new, and often did not see how household nutrition, sanitation or hygiene might be 
responsible for the child’s health. Many went so far as to say they did not see any difference in the 
quality or quantity of food being provided to the child at the facility versus home. In just one MTC 
in Jharkhand did patients who had been discharged recall the education and counseling sessions as 
it involved various multimedia and visual aids to educate the women. Interestingly other facilities 
also had a separate room for women to sit, toys for the children and multimedia equipment, 
however these spaces were locked and the nurses in charge did not give entry to the mothers or 
their children. 
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8.5 Recommendations 
The state of NRCs in both states shows great disparity and is an expected result of Madhya 
Pradesh’s longer history in operating NRCs in their state. Key recommendations for improving 
supply-side factors in both states to strengthen the management of NRCs include strengthening 
capacity and discretion, through hiring adequate personnel and staff who can better address SAM 
cases individually rather than applying the same approach to all cases. 
 Another means of strengthening supply side conditions is in improving the budgets of 
NRCs, which has been under duress, and leading to the discontinuation of vital maintenance 
personnel who are essential for preventing children who are already vulnerable upon admission to 
health complications. Budgetary support could also ensure that mothers are being provided meals 
in states like Jharkhand, where they currently have no such provisions. 
 To ensure the admission at an NRC has long-lasting impacts, a focus on counseling and 
education has to be strengthened, whereas currently there is generally no structure for such 
interactive programs. Without this type of engagement over the two weeks or more that a mother 
is at the facility, it is unlikely that sustainable change is possible, as we observe in the number of 
cases of readmission in Madhya Pradesh. In line with counseling, especially among mothers from 
more remote and ethnically diverse communities as observed in Jharkhand, some level of training 
should be given to NRC staff to show greater empathy in their interactions and dealings with these 
mothers. Often there are not only cultural but linguistic differences, which can also make the NRC 
experience for both the mother who is supposed to be receiving vital information for the care of 
her child, as well as for the medical staff who would not be able to effectively communicate with 
these mothers. Finally dietary options that are more in line with household budgets and resources, 
as conceived of by Bengoa is necessary for any of the benefits of the NRC’s feeding practices be 
transferred to the home setting. Heavy reliance on products such as milk can often not be replicated 
by mothers as this is beyond their financial means. 
 Beyond the NRC operations themselves, two other factors become evident in the 
interviews. One, while causal relations cannot be established from this specific study as to what 
may have been the culprit in a child’s deteriorating nutritional status, many of the patients admitted 
indicated problems in accessing other social programs and benefits, including the TPDS and ICDS. 
Strengthening of this access overall is imperative, and educating women who come about availing 
their benefits, especially now that they are a right, would go a long way to curb some portion of 
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strain experienced by financially insecure households. Second, the experiences of the mothers at 
NRCs are a rallying cry for far-reaching reforms to improve the state of women and young girls in 
India in general. Poor levels of education, limited personal and reproductive choice, and insecure 
livelihood sources are all influential factors in the nutritional outcomes a child born to such girls 
or women. Strengthening ties between AWW of the ICDS and NRC administrators can be a 
starting point to better address the cyclical nature of poor nutrition, including through better 
supervision by AWW of discharged patients when they return to the community. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
 
 
The National Food Security Act came as a welcome victory after nearly a decade and a half of 
agitation and mobilization to recognize the right to food in India. Two aspects of this legislation 
were critical: 1) it granted a legal entitlement to existing food and nutrition benefits to the majority 
of the Indian population, and 2) it proclaimed a life cycle approach to achieve food and nutrition 
security. In the years since the bill’s passing, a verdict is still pending on how successful the Act 
has been in achieving the gains of securing food and nutrition security for two-thirds of the 
population. While the Act and its implementation have grabbed many headlines, far less work has 
examined how the few reforms the Act outlines, can curb the governance challenges that have 
plagued many of India’s social welfare programs for decades. 
This thesis aimed to map the institutional functioning of two core programs of the Act, the 
TPDS and the ICDS, which have for several decades existed as the dominant programs in 
addressing food and nutrition security in India. Through a range of qualitative methods, these 
programs were mapped in the wake of the Act to understand the operations, stakeholders and 
institutional challenges that persist. Furthermore, nutrition rehabilitation centers (NRCs) treating 
severe acute malnutrition among children were also studied to understand the institutional 
management of such cases and the challenges faced, as well as to engage patients and their 
households on their understanding of undernutrition and the pathways of acute undernutrition. 
These narratives cast light on the changing realities for Indians and circumstances that may 
exacerbate conditions that lead to poor health and nutrition outcomes for their children. 
 
9.1 Outcome of Demand-Side Approaches 
Civic Discourse and the Language of Rights 
The movement that led to the passage of the Act has in and of itself become a rooted demand-side 
strategy and resource for the public. With the success of various rights-based legislation, these 
nation-wide campaigns and groups have continued to be active in publicly clamoring for reforms 
that either have yet to be implemented or need to be addressed. Especially in the capital of Delhi, 
such groups have been at the forefront of leading public hearings, carrying out strikes and 
appealing through the courts for more reforms and holding government accountable (Bhatnagar, 
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2018b, 2018c; Shukla, 2018). Hence creating a legal entitlement has been able to galvanize 
members of civil society to probe public officials and use public fora to air the gaps in the 
implementation of various entitlements. 
 The extent of such groups and movements, however, is a different issue. While many are 
based in urban areas or the capital, it is unclear how much of this outreach is able to reach the most 
remote and marginalized areas despite their best efforts. During the course of this field work, it 
became abundantly clear that in both Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand, there was minimal 
understanding of one’s rights and entitlements under this Act. Therefore translating the strength of 
that movement to the more marginalized and remote areas of the country through either local 
NGOs or various community-based groups will be essential in scaling up the collective power to 
bring meaningful reforms that are suited to the context of local communities. 
 
Grievance Redressal Mechanism 
While the NFSA specifically stipulates a grievance redressal mechanism at multiple levels of 
administration as well as in the state government, in most study sites visited, it has not been 
operational. As learned in Delhi, district officials had to be confronted by civil society groups to 
learn that they had been appointed the District Grievance Redressal Officer, adding one more task 
to the lengthy list of duties and responsibilities these officials already bear. In Jharkhand, it is more 
troubling that while in theory there is a grievance committee, it consists of the very people who 
many FPS dealers had identified as extorting money or grains from their allocation. The 
combination of weak political will in setting up these grievance bodies, poor dissemination of 
information to the greater public about their existence and no concrete guidelines requiring a 
minimum time frame to respond to grievances or issue hearings have hampered the ability of this 
mechanism to exact justice. District officials also felt that such a mechanism is not the most helpful 
for poorer individuals who would have to sacrifice working days to attend such hearings, which 
itself weakens the empowerment effect of such a system. 
 
9.2 Outcome of Supply-Side and Mixed Approaches 
Technology: A Boon and a Bane 
As this study revealed, the reforms stated in the Act have had mixed effects. The use of technology 
while perceived as a silver bullet by most administrative officials proved to have both practical 
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and institutional limitations in curbing governance challenges. This study corroborated the 
findings of several other reports of the infrastructural shortfalls that make computerization up to 
the point of sale at times faulty (Bhatnagar, 2018b; Sen, 2017). Moreover, technology was viewed 
as a means to address the challenge of pilferage and leakages from the TPDS system through 
transparent electronic records of food grain movement and entitlements, but also through the use 
of biometric means to verify the authenticity of a beneficiary. As discussed in Chapter 6, however, 
transparency in terms of more information being available to the public does not actually reform 
the challenge of accountability and responsiveness of the state to gaps in implementation (Aceron 
et al., 2017). In this case, technological advances have managed to cut down on various fake 
beneficiaries, but this has come at the cost of excluding legitimate beneficiaries (Drèze et al., 2017; 
Singh, 2018) Perhaps the most apt response to the use of technology was that of the FPS dealer in 
Madhya Pradesh who revealed that with or without technology, there has to be an official or 
authority figure who cares about the lapses that the technological solution is disclosing. 
 Moreover, the technological interventions prescribed do little to obstruct the distribution 
of poor quality grains or in cutting the amount ultimately sold to the beneficiary, as that is 
completely outside of the system and is digitally entered by the Dealer. With no effective complaint 
mechanism, the status quo can continue with no beneficiary able to voice themselves. 
 
Empowerment and the Role of Women 
The NFSA has an entire section devoted to women’s empowerment and all three programs studied 
in this thesis hinge on the role of women. The Act not only makes the eldest woman in a household 
above the age of 18 the head for the purpose of availing subsidized grains, but also makes special 
mention of women’s groups as a vehicle for grain distribution and the representation of women in 
the multi-tiered grievance and monitoring mechanism. 
 From a cursory glance, there does seem to be greater involvement of women as a result of 
these reforms, specifically in Jharkhand, though their emphasis on women’s SHGs precedes the 
NFSA. In Madhya Pradesh, however, this is still an area that is almost entirely run by men. In both 
Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand this study found that women’s SHGs played a critical role, though 
in different programs. In Jharkhand, women’s SHGs were given priority as FPS dealers while in 
Madhya Pradesh women’s SHGs were given responsibility for providing meals for the ICDS 
nutrition program. A crucial lapse in practice, though, is that many FPS are registered in Jharkhand 
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under the auspices of a women’s SHG but entirely run by a male relative. Jharkhand’s women 
SHGs remained vulnerable to the forms of exploitation that have plagued FPS dealers in the past, 
including reduced grains received, bribes to retain their license or to ease their application for an 
FPS. However, for beneficiaries in the communities visited there was greater proximity to their 
local store for ration and there was greater regularity for purchasing grains. On the other hand in 
Madhya Pradesh, where male agricultural cooperative societies run the FPS, as one member of the 
cooperative runs multiple stores, beneficiaries had a much smaller window to purchase grains and 
many still had to travel longer distances. 
Women’s SHGs in the ICDS of Madhya Pradesh fared a similar fate, whereby beneficiaries 
seemed to find that there was greater regularity of meals, however the groups themselves were 
under pressure due to pending reimbursements from administrators. This meant that many SHGs 
would have to relinquish their ICDS activities at a loss without the repayment of their expenses. 
 
9.3 The Missing Pieces 
The absence of a functional grievance redressal mechanism or social accountability measures is a 
substantial gap in the rollout of the NFSA, and undermines the very basis for a rights-based 
approach (Pieterse, 2007). In addition to what is not being implemented, however, there exist 
major gaps in the Act’s philosophy of approaching food and nutrition security. It claims to have a 
life-cycle approach when its provisions are very limited to rudimentary food-based provisions 
under programs that still suffer from governance challenges. This is disappointing in light of the 
research that has taken root over recent years that point to other systemic problems that are equally 
damaging to optimal nutrition outcomes (Coffey, 2015; Coffey & Spears, 2018; Story & Carpiano, 
2015). The study of NRCs especially highlighted the compounding of deprivation that can result 
in severe wasting in children, even when these entitlement programs exist. Factors as broad as 
child marriage, compromised health and nutrition of the mother, poor sanitation and hygiene, 
insecure livelihoods and forced migration and general lack of awareness in identifying signs of 
poor health and nutrition, particularly if one lives in communities where such deprivation is 
prevalent (Kamath et al., 2015; Raj et al., 2010; Roy, 2016), all affect outcomes. Without a more 
holistic approach to food and nutrition security that examines these ancillary factors, tackling this 
challenge will remain elusive. 
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9.4 The Road Ahead 
This study found that many things that are extensively discussed in academic and development 
literature as being solutions to addressing existing social ills, have in reality had a far murkier 
experience on the ground. Technology, group-based management of programs or collective action, 
and socioeconomic rights can hold great potential when an accountable institutional context is 
present. However in communities where there is great disenfranchisement of women, high 
illiteracy, poor infrastructure and an overall lack of awareness in basic rights and entitlements, 
these initiatives can stumble. Consequently, this underlines the idea that no single prescription is 
perhaps a cure for the varying settings throughout India where stark social, economic and cultural 
disparities exist. 
 One of the recurring themes across the communities interviewed was that there is greater 
migration during the year to find livelihood sources. This was far greater in Jharkhand where for 
many there is not much alternative in livelihoods, especially among tribal populations. The 
Economic Survey of India has also confirmed that of all states in India, Jharkhand loses the highest 
percentage of its working age population to migration during the year, nearly five percent. 
Furthermore, female migration has almost doubled across the country since a decade ago. As a 
result, even in cases where in their home village they have access to benefits, once they travel for 
work to distant towns or even other states, they are without any of the benefits of these programs.  
A critical reform in this context would be the portability of these benefits across villages and towns, 
if not also states, so that individuals are able to lead dignified lives without compromising basic 
necessities for their own or their children’s health. As outmigration from rural areas continues with 
falling agricultural work and wages, much work has pointed to the growing numbers of urban poor 
and vulnerable groups (Bowen et al., 2011; “Migration from Jharkhand Highest in Country: 
Economic Survey,” 2017). 
 A second path forward that can play a crucial role in bringing about tangible reforms to 
public programs is to propel the civil society movement that has brought India this far. In addition 
to the ongoing bouts of naming and shaming of officials, fighting cases in court and setting up 
committees to investigate cases of deprivation and exclusion, these groups can push for greater 
social accountability mechanisms. These include public hearings, social audits and grievance 
camps  (Bussell, 2010; Feruglio & Nisbett, 2018; Swain & Sen, 2009), that not only provide 
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services such as registering complaints or assess the performance of programs, but they enlighten 
the citizenry about their entitlements and the power they have to claim these benefits. 
 The third crucial pathway to see tangible change requires not only reforms of programs but 
a revolution in the role of women in society. All the three programs undertaken in this thesis have 
one thing in common: to truly succeed they require the empowerment of women and mothers in a 
context where these individuals often have the least voice. Access to education, livelihoods and 
health services targeting young adolescents and women have to be pursued with a renewed vigor 
(Akter et al., 2017; Cunningham et al., 2015; Prillaman, 2017).  
 
9.5 Limitations of this Study 
This study required diverse qualitative tools to approach the study objectives. While these tools 
were especially selected for their strengths in teasing out the institutional challenges of 
implementing large scale food and nutrition programs in India, they still presented certain 
limitations. Limitations also exist by the very nature of the topic of this study as it draws a great 
deal of attention in the public sphere, whether in the news media or among administrators. 
Speaking about the irregularities of programs that have been the lifeline of India’s nutrition 
programming comes at the risk of the interviewee, which may affect their responses. 
 For the study on the TPDS, the main methods used were the process net-mapping, key 
informant interviews, and focus group discussions (FGD). The mapping exercise is generally 
conducted with a representative group of stakeholders either with knowledge or involvement in 
the functioning of the program (Schiffer & Hauck, 2010). While there are many actors involved in 
the TPDS, the FPS dealer is one individual who must interact with all off them and is often 
attributed the most blame by the public when there are any gaps in service. Some may argue that 
given FPS dealers have been deemed an equal part of the problems with the TPDS, their accounts 
may be false. However, all responses were triangulated through direct observation, FGDs with 
beneficiaries, and interviews with government administrators of the TPDS, as well as civil society 
actors on the ground. Given their unique role in the larger system, they seemed ideal for this 
exercise and revealed systematic failings in program delivery, including their own infractions. 
However, the possibility remains that they may have held back important details or covered up the 
full extent of their own misdeeds. 
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 With the ICDS study as well, one stakeholder who must interface with all the constituent 
actors in the system, the AWW, was the subject of the mapping exercise. Just as with the FPS 
dealer, to achieve a better understanding of the ground realities of how nutrition services are 
provided through the program, the AWWs seemed uniquely placed. Their responses were cross-
checked with those of beneficiaries as well as government officials. Nonetheless, there was much 
more fear visible among the AWWs to speak freely, which may mean that their accounts were not 
fully transparent, or details have been altered to safeguard their professional interests. 
 At the NRCs, while every effort was made to interview admitted mothers out of earshot of 
the facility staff, there were a few instances where the nurse on duty would follow the subject 
around. In one specific instance, two program officers of the ICDS approached the interview 
session and aggressively inquired as to the nature of the exchange. They then continued to stand 
watch as the interviewer asked the mother a series of household-related questions. Consequently, 
it is difficult to know whether mothers felt the pressure or gaze of staff who are providing their 
child with essential services, thus affecting their responses. 
 In FGDs, while the beneficiaries generally seemed open and transparent about sharing their 
experiences with using the TPDS and ICDS, there may still have been some biases. For example, 
when asked about their dependence on the services of the ICDS, there may be some social 
desirability bias in the responses of those who do not wish to publicly admit to their need for such 
nutrition benefits for themselves or their child out of embarrassment or a sense of shame (Hébert, 
2016; King & Bruner, 2000). 
 Being a female researcher and non-native of the study sites may have also affected how 
some subjects responded. This difference was most visible in dealing with FPS dealers in the two 
states. While there is always a general reservation to speak openly about the malpractices in 
implementation, it was easier to build trust and elicit more in-depth answers with the women 
dealers in Jharkhand. In Madhya Pradesh, however, most of the FPS dealers were older men who 
had been running these shops for the better part of two to three decades. The most open exchanges 
took place when there was a male field assistant present. It should also be noted that the 
communities visited in Madhya Pradesh seemed more conservative in the matter of interactions 
between men and women; women generally had their heads or faces covered when speaking to 
older men or men not from within the household. This made the researcher more conspicuous and 
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could have made some male dealers uncomfortable either due to the prevailing social norms or by 
posing a risk to their work in the presence of any bystanders. 
 In any study that requires participants to base responses on their memory, there is scope 
for recall errors. Furthermore, as this study undertook a case study approach, many of the findings 
reflect local settings, norms and conditions which are not representative of the country. In addition 
to the methodological limitation, mid-way through the field work, the Indian government 
demonetized over 80 percent of India’s currency overnight. This cut short the field work in Madhya 
Pradesh and New Delhi, making it difficult to hold more FGDs and also access more government 
administrators. However, despite these limitations, this exercise opens one’s eyes to the minutiae 
involved in the running of such programs at the community level and the demands it makes on 
stakeholders on the supply and demand side. It also provides tedious nuance on how various efforts 
which look good on paper run into friction on the ground, urging practitioners and policy makers 
to think twice before making blanket recommendations for any measure. 
 
9.6 Conclusion 
The NFSA and India’s larger rights-based movement have established the power of civic 
mobilization and advocacy to advance a more inclusive agenda for the most vulnerable in Indian 
society. While this movement has created space to invoke one’s rights for social entitlements, the 
reforms by which it hopes to achieve them may only be able to move the country halfway towards 
its food and nutrition goals. Rights without accountability, and nutrition policy that fails to look 
beyond the plate are unlikely to hasten India’s progress in escaping the country’s legacy of a life 
of contradictions for the masses. 
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